TOWN OF NORTHWOOD
TERRORISM ANNEX
Table of Contents

I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................TA-1
   A. Purpose .....................................................................................................................................TA-1
   B. Scope .........................................................................................................................................TA-2
   C. Structure ....................................................................................................................................TA-2
II. Situation and Planning Assumptions .........................................................................................TA-4
   A. Situation ....................................................................................................................................TA-4
   B. Planning Assumptions ..............................................................................................................TA-4
   C. Terrorism Hazards ....................................................................................................................TA-7
III. Concept of Operations ..............................................................................................................TA-15
   A. General ......................................................................................................................................TA-15
   B. Organization .............................................................................................................................TA-18
   C. Warning .....................................................................................................................................TA-20
   D. Notification and Activation .......................................................................................................TA-21
   E. Communications .........................................................................................................................TA-21
   F. Plan Implementation ....................................................................................................................TA-21
   G. Incident Phases ...........................................................................................................................TA-23
   H. Protective Actions ......................................................................................................................TA-27
   I. Resource Management ..............................................................................................................TA-28
   J. Roles and Responsibilities ..........................................................................................................TA-28
IV. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS ......................................................................................TA-36
V. Authorities & References ...........................................................................................................TA-37
   A. Plans .........................................................................................................................................TA-37
   B. Standard Operating Procedures/Guides (SOPs/SOGs)/Checklists ........................................TA-38
VI. Attachments ..............................................................................................................................TA-38
   A. Forms ........................................................................................................................................TA-38

TAB A: FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: COUNTERTERRORISM-SPECIFIC ROLES  
....................................................................................................................................................TA-A-1
TAB B: HOTLINES AND ONLINE RESOURCES ..............................................................................TA-B-1
TAB C: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE – 39.................................................................TA-C-1
TAB D: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE – 62.................................................................TA-D-1
TAB E: Presidential Decision Directive – 63....................................................................................TA-E-1
**Primary Departments:**
- Northwood Emergency Management
- Northwood Police Department
- Northwood Fire Department
- Northwood Highway Department
- Northwood Health Department

**Support Departments:**
- Northwood EOC Responding Departments to Support Functional Activities

**Shared Lead Agencies:**
- Department of Justice/Attorney General
- DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE – VICTIM ADVOCATE SERVICES *
- Department of Justice – Victim Compensation *
- New Hampshire State Police
- Department of Safety – Division of Fire Safety and Emergency Management
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Fire Marshal Office
- Department of Agriculture
- Department of Administrative Services, Division of Information Management.

**Support Agencies State:**
- State EOC Responding Agencies to Support Functional Activities.
  * Terrorism Incidents only

**I. INTRODUCTION**

**A. Purpose**
This Terrorism Annex is to ensure that the Town of Northwood Emergency Operations Plan is adequate to respond to threats of and acts of terrorism within the town. This document:

1. **Defines response and recovery actions.**
2. **Generally describes operational procedures.**
3. **Defines Emergency Support Functions.**
The Town of Northwood will use established response and recovery policies, plans, and procedures/guides for both initial and continuing response and recovery actions at the local level.

**B. Scope**

1. This document applies to all threats or acts of terrorism that require response and recovery actions under the Northwood EOP.

2. It provides coordination between response and recovery agencies and will provide the necessary resources under the Northwood EOP. In order to properly address and manage all phases of a terrorist incident, the response and recovery efforts are its two components.

**C. Structure**

The Terrorism Annex to the Northwood EOP is a compendium on the management of terrorist incidents. It focuses on the management of the event as well as linkage to the response and recovery actions to terrorist incident(s).

1. **Response actions** includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.

   a. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance, as required.

   b. Response actions are predominantly law enforcement oriented and address both initial and continuing actions associated with the terrorist event.

   c. Based on the situation and type of terrorist event, a State or a State/Federal initial and continuing response may be supported by state-designated shared lead agencies, technical operations, additional State and Federal assets, all of which may operate concurrently.

2. **Recovery actions** include measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses and individuals affected by the terrorism event.

   a. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond both initially and on a continuing basis to the recovery requirements of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required.
b. Recovery actions can and often do, operate concurrently with Response Actions. **Figure 1** illustrates the relationships between the two components and is based on a unified command or management organizational structure.

*Figure 1 - The relationships between response and recovery action management*
II. SITUATION AND PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

A. Situation
1. Until such time as an incident is determined to be an act of terrorism, response operations will be implemented under the Northwood EOP and its ESF components.
2. A general concern or actual threat of an act of terrorism occurring at or during a special event within the Town of Northwood may cause the Town Elected Officials, Governor, as well as the President, to implement precautionary measures that may include some of the actions described in this Annex.
3. When directed, the Town of Northwood will coordinate with the appropriate law enforcement and shared lead agencies to identify potential requirements and, if necessary, with the Bureau of Emergency Management to implement increased readiness operations.
4. Information surrounding the environment, population, regional location, critical infrastructure, transportation, government facilities, recreational facilities, military facilities and hazardous materials are addressed in the Northwood EOP.

B. Planning Assumptions
1. No single agency at the local, State, Federal or private level possesses the authority and the expertise to act unilaterally on many difficult issues that may arise in response to threats or acts of terrorism, particularly if CBRNE/WMD, Cyber- and/or Agro-terrorism are involved.
2. Local, State, and Federal responders may define working perimeters that may overlap to some degree. Perimeters may be used to control access to the area, target public information messages, assign operational sectors among responding organizations, and assess potential effects on the population and the environment. Control of these perimeters may be enforced by different authorities, which may impede the overall response if adequate coordination is not established.
3. If protective capabilities are not available, responders cannot be required to put their own lives at risk in order to enter a perimeter contaminated with CBRNE material. It is possible that the perimeter will be closed until the CBRNE agent is identified or the effects of the CBRNE material have degraded to levels that are safe for responders.
4. Although this annex takes into consideration the most probable scenarios relating to the primary categories of terrorism incidents, no assumptions should be made to the annex being all inclusive of every conceivable situation that a terrorism incident could create. Emergency responders:

   a. will assess the situation and determine the best course of action based upon their training and prescribed policies, plans, and procedures.

   b. Obvious assumptions should also be included: that identified hazards will occur, that individuals and organizations are familiar with the local EOP and the Terrorism Annex and will execute their assigned responsibilities, and that assistance may be needed. EXAMPLE: This plan will go into effect when a WMD incident has occurred or a credible threat has been identified.
| Maps                      | Use detailed, current maps and charts.  
|                         | Include demographic information.  
|                         | Use natural and manmade boundaries and structures to identify risk areas.  
|                         | Annotate evacuation routes and alternatives.  
|                         | ANNOTATE IN-PLACE SHELTERING LOCATIONS.  
|                         | USE GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS (GIS) AND ANALYTICAL TOOLS (E.G., THE CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL SET [CATS]), AS APPROPRIATE.  
| Environment \( ^{a} \) | Determine response routes and times.  
|                         | Include bodies of water with dams or levees (these could become contaminated).  
|                         | Specify special weather and climate features that could alter the effects of a WMD (strong winds, heavy rains, etc.).  
| Population \( ^{b} \)  | Identify those most susceptible to WMD effects or otherwise hindered or unable to care for themselves.  
|                         | Identify areas where large concentrations of the population might be located, such as sports arenas and major transportation centers.  
|                         | List areas that may include retirement communities.  
|                         | Note locations of correctional facilities.  
|                         | Note locations of hospitals/medical centers/schools/day care centers where multiple evacuees may need assistance.  
|                         | Identify non-English-speaking populations.  
| Regional                | Identify multi-jurisdictional perimeters and boundaries.  
|                         | Identify potentially overlapping areas for response.  
|                         | Identify rural, urban, suburban, and city (e.g., city-sprawl/surroundings) mutual risk areas.  
|                         | Identify mutual aid resources from adjoining municipalities.  
|                         | Identify terrorism-specific resources from adjoining municipalities.  
|                         | Identify specific or unique characteristics such as interchanges, choke points, traffic lights, traffic schemes and patterns, access roads, tunnels, bridges, railroad crossings, and overpasses and/or clover leafs.  
| Resources               | Identify mutual aid resources.  
|                         | Identify terrorism-specific resources.  

\( ^{a} \) The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will work with State and local officials on environmental planning issues.  
\( ^{b} \) The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), in close cooperation with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), will work with local and State officials on these issues.

*Figure 2 - Suggested Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) Elements*
C. **Terrorism Hazards**

1. The State of New Hampshire has developed a threat and vulnerability database addressing each of the terrorism hazards identified in this section. The information contained in the database is considered law enforcement sensitive. Access to the information will be considered on a case-by-case, need to know basis.

2. **Terrorism** involves the use or threatened use of criminal violence against people, institutions, livestock, food sources or facilities to achieve a political or social objective through fear and intimidation, rather than direct confrontation. Unlike a disaster caused by nature or an accident involving hazardous materials, it requires the deliberate and premeditated action of a person or group to occur.

3. **Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)** – Weapons of mass destruction are defined as any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals; disease organisms; radiation or radioactivity; or explosion or fire. At least two important considerations distinguish these hazards from other types of terrorist tools. First, in the case of chemical, biological, and radioactive agents, their presence may not be immediately obvious, making it difficult to determine when and where they have been released, who has been exposed, and what danger is present for first responders and medical technicians. Second, although there is a sizable body of research on battlefield exposures to WMD agents, there is limited scientific understanding of how these agents affect civilian populations. They are described in law as:

   a. **Incendiary/Explosives** – The easiest to obtain and use of all weapons is still a conventional explosive device, or improvised bomb, which may be used to cause massive local destruction or to disperse chemical, biological, or radiological agents. The components are readily available, as are detailed instructions on constructing such a device. Improvised explosive devices are categorized as being explosive or incendiary, employing high or low filler explosive materials to explode and/or cause fires. Projectiles and missiles, including aircraft used against high-profile targets such as buildings, monuments, and special events, also can cause explosions and fires. Bombs and firebombs are cheap and easily constructed, involve low technology, and are the terrorist weapon most likely to be encountered. Large, powerful devices can be outfitted with timed or remotely triggered detonators and can be designed to be activated by light, pressure, movement, or radio transmission. The potential exists for single or multiple bombing incidents in single or multiple municipalities. Historically, less than five percent of actual or attempted bombings were preceded by a threat. Explosive materials can be employed covertly with little signature and are not readily detectable. Secondary explosive devices may also be used as weapons against
responders and the public in coincident acts. Other diversionary events or attacks could also be aimed at responders.

b. **Combined Hazards** – WMD agents can be combined to achieve a synergistic effect – greater in total effect than the sum of their individual effects. They may be combined to achieve both immediate and delayed consequences. Mixed infections or toxic exposures may occur, thereby complicating or delaying diagnosis. Casualties of multiple agents may exist; casualties may also suffer from multiple effects, such as trauma and burns from an explosion, which exacerbate the likelihood of agent contamination. Attacks may be planned and executed so as to take advantage of the reduced effectiveness of protective measures produced by employment of an initial WMD agent. Finally, the potential exists for multiple incidents in single or multiple municipalities.

c. **Biological** – Recognition of a biological hazard can occur through several methods, including identification of a credible threat, discovery of bioterrorism evidence (devices, agent, clandestine lab), diagnosis (identification of a disease caused by an agent identified as a possible bioterrorism agent), and detection (gathering and interpretation of public health surveillance data). When people are exposed to a pathogen such as anthrax or smallpox, they may not know that they have been exposed, and those who are infected, or subsequently become infected, may not feel sick for some time. This delay between exposure and onset of illness, the incubation period, is characteristic of infectious diseases. The incubation period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on the exposure and pathogen. Unlike acute incidents involving explosives or some hazardous chemicals, the initial detection and response to a biological attack on civilians is likely to be made by direct patient care providers and the public health community. Terrorists could also employ a biological agent that would affect agricultural commodities over a large area (e.g., wheat rust or a virus affecting livestock), potentially devastating the local or even national economy. The response to agricultural bioterrorism should also be considered during the planning process. Responders should be familiar with the characteristics of the biological agents of greatest concern for use in a bioterrorism event. Unlike victims of exposure to chemical or radiological agents, victims of biological agent attack may serve as carriers of the disease with the capability of infecting others (e.g., smallpox, plague). Some indicators of biological attack are given in Figure 3.
d. **Chemical** – Chemical agents are intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects. A terrorist incident involving a chemical agent will demand immediate reaction from emergency responders—fire departments, police, hazardous materials (HazMat) teams, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency room staff—who will need adequate training and equipment. Hazardous chemicals, including industrial chemicals and agents, can be introduced via aerosol devices (e.g., munitions, sprayers, or aerosol generators), breaking containers, or covert dissemination. Such an attack might involve the release of a chemical warfare agent, such as a nerve or blister agent or an industrial chemical, which may have serious consequences. Some indicators of the possible use of chemical agents are listed in **Figure 4**. Early in an investigation, it may not be obvious whether an infectious agent or a hazardous chemical caused an outbreak; however, most chemical attacks will be localized, and their effects will be evident within a few minutes. There are both persistent and non-persistent chemical agents. Persistent agents remain in the affected area for hours, days, or weeks. Non-persistent agents have high evaporation rates, are lighter than air, and disperse rapidly, thereby losing their ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes, although they may be more persistent in small, unventilated areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stated Threat to Release a Chemical Agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unusual Occurrence of Dead or Dying Animals</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For example, lack of insects, dead birds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complaint of Product Tempering</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unexplained/Unusual odor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unusual taste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unexplained Casualties</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multiple victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Surge of similar 911 calls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Serious illnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nausea, disorientation, difficulty breathing, or convulsions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Definite casualty patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor, or Powder</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Droplets, oily film</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unexplained odor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low-lying clouds/fog unrelated to weather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suspicious Devices, Packages, or Letters</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unusual metal debris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Abandoned spray devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unexplained munitions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4 - General Indicators of Possible Chemical Agent Use*

e. **Nuclear and radiological** – The difficulty of responding to a nuclear or radiological incident is compounded by the nature of radiation itself. In an explosion, the fact that radioactive material was involved may or may not be obvious, depending upon the nature of the explosive device used. The presence of a radiation hazard is difficult to ascertain, unless the responders have the proper detection equipment and have been trained to use it properly. Although many detection devices exist, most are designed to detect specific types and levels of radiation and may not be appropriate for measuring or ruling out the presence of radiological hazards. *Figure 5* lists some indicators of a radiological release.
**Figure 5: General Indicators of Possible Nuclear Weapon/Radiological Agent Use**

The scenarios constituting an intentional nuclear/radiological emergency include the following:

1) Use of an **improvised nuclear device (IND)** includes any explosive device designed to cause a nuclear yield. Depending on the type of trigger device used, either uranium or plutonium isotopes can fuel these devices. While “weapons-grade” material increases the efficiency of a given device, materials of less than weapons grade can still be used.

2) Use of a **radiological dispersal device (RDD)** includes any explosive device utilized to spread radioactive material upon detonation. By placing radiological material in close proximity, any improvised device could be used.

3) Use of a **simple RDD** that spreads radiological material without the use of an explosive. Any nuclear material (including medical isotopes or waste) can be used in this manner.

f. **Cyber-terrorism** – Cyber-terrorism involves the malicious use of electronic information technology to commit or threaten to commit acts dangerous to human life, or against a nation’s critical infrastructures in order to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population to further political or social objectives (FBI NIPC, Congressional testimony, August 29, 2001). As with other critical infrastructure guidance, most cyber protection guidance focuses on security measures to protect computer systems against intrusions, denial of service attacks, and other forms of attack rather than addressing issues related to contingency and consequence management planning.
### STATED THREAT OF A CYBER- TERRORISM ATTACK

#### DETECTION OF A COMPUTER VIRUS BY A SOFTWARE PROGRAM

Unexplained Malfunctioning of a Computer Control System That Could Result in Injury or Death

- Dam or Levy
- 9-1-1 System
- Streetlights
- Air Traffic Control System

#### COLLAPSE OF INFRASTRUCTURE COMPUTER SYSTEM

- Electric Power Grid
- Nuclear Power Plant
- Water Treatment Plant

#### COLLAPSE OF VITAL COMPUTER DATABASES

- NCIC

---

**Figure 6 - General Indicators of Possible Cyber-terrorism Attack**

- **Agro-terrorism** – Any terrorist act using biological agents, achieved by poisoning the food or water supplies or by introducing diseases among livestock. This can involve the use of chemical or biological agents.

---

**Stated Threat to Release a Chemical/Biological Agent into the Agriculture Industry**

*Unusual Liquid, Spray, Vapor or Powder*

**UNEXPLAINED PRESENCE OF DEAD OR DYING ANIMALS, BIRDS AND/OR INSECTS**

Presence of Abandoned Spray Devices

---

**Figure 7 - General Indicators of Possible Cyber-terrorism Attack**
4. **Other Terrorism Hazards** – Although it is not realistically possible to plan for and prevent every conceivable type of terrorist attack, it is anticipated that future terrorism attempts could range from simple, isolated attacks to complex, sophisticated, highly coordinated acts of destruction using multiple agents aimed at one or multiple targets. Therefore, the plans developed for terrorist incidents must be broad in scope yet flexible enough to deal with the unexpected. These considerations are particularly important in planning to handle the consequences of attacks using low-tech devices and delivery, assaults on public infrastructure, and cyber terrorism. In these cases, the training and experience of the responders may be more important than detailed procedures.

a. **Low-Tech Devices and Delivery** – Planning for the possibility of terrorist attacks must consider the fact that explosives can be delivered by a variety of methods. Most explosive and incendiary devices used by terrorists would be expected to fall outside the definition of a WMD. Small explosive devices can be left in packages or bags in public areas for later detonation, or they can be attached directly to a suicide bomber for detonation at a time and place when and where the terrorist feels that maximum damage can be done. The relatively small size of these explosive devices and the absence of specific security measures in most areas make these types of terrorist attacks extremely difficult to prevent. Small explosive devices can also be brought onto planes, trains, ships, or buses, within checked bags or hand carried. Although present airline security measures minimize the possibility of explosives being brought on board airliners, planners will need to consider the level of security presently employed on ships, trains, and buses within their jurisdictions. Larger quantities of explosive materials can be delivered to their intended target area by means of car or truck bombs.

b. **Infrastructure Attacks** – Potential attacks on elements of the nation’s infrastructure require protective considerations. Infrastructure protection will involve proactive risk management actions to prevent the destruction of or incapacitating damage to networks and systems that serve our communities.
1) Infrastructure protection often is more focused on security, deterrence, and law enforcement than on emergency preparedness and response. The State of New Hampshire’s departments and agencies must develop contingency plans in the event critical infrastructures are brought down as the result of a terrorist incident.

2) Presidential Decision Directive 63 was issued in May 1998. It established the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and outlined steps to be taken to protect critical infrastructures from disruptions that could have serious public health and safety, economic, or national security impacts.
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. General

1. Response and Recovery actions to terrorist events will be conducted in accordance with established State policies, plans, procedures, and guides.
   
   a. The Attorney General/NH State Police maintain the State’s lead responsibility for response management to threats or acts of terrorism that take place within New Hampshire.
   
   b. STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT has responsibility for all recovery actions throughout the State.

2. The Northwood EOP – Terrorism Annex provides a graduated flexible response and recovery actions to the full range of incidents.

3. An act of terrorism exceeding the local capability to resolve automatically goes to the state level for assistance.

4. Major tasks that will be carried out by all ESFs, departments/agencies and organizations as assigned.
### Figure 8 - Responses to a WMD Incident and the Participants Involved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Incident occurs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 9-1-1 center receives calls, elicits information, dispatches first responders, relays information to first responders prior to their arrival on scene, makes notifications, and consults existing databases of chemical hazards in the community, as required.</td>
<td>9-1-1 Center, first responders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. First responders arrive on scene and make initial assessment. Establish Incident Command and set up Command Post in an area that is safe from potential secondary hazards/devices. Determine potential weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident and possible terrorist involvement; warn additional responders to the scene of potential secondary hazards/devices. Perform any obvious rescues as incident permits. Establish security perimeter and credentialing. Determine needs for additional assistance. Begin triage and treatment of victims. Begin hazard agent identification</td>
<td>Incident Command: Fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services (EMS), and HazMat unit(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Incident Command manages incident response; notifies medical facility, emergency management (EM), and other local organizations outlined in Emergency Operations Plan (EOP); requests notification of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Field Office.</td>
<td>Incident Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Special Agent in Charge (SAC) assesses information, supports local law enforcement, and determines WMD terrorist incident has occurred. Notifies Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), activates Joint Operations Center (JOC), coordinates the crisis management aspects of WMD incident, and acts as the Federal on-scene manager for the U.S. government while FBI is Lead Federal Agency (LFA).</td>
<td>FBI Field Office: SAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>Participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Local Emergency Operations Center (EOC) activated. Supports Incident Command, as required by Incident Commander (IC). Coordinates consequence management activities (e.g., mass care). Local authorities declare state of emergency. Coordinates with State EOC and State and Federal agencies, as required. Requests State and Federal assistance, as necessary.</td>
<td>Local EOC: Local agencies, as identified in basic EOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Strategic local coordination of crisis management activities. Brief President, National Security Council (NSC), and Attorney General. Provide Headquarters (HQ) support to JOC. Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) may be deployed. Notification of FEMA by FBI/SIOC triggers FEMA actions.</td>
<td>SIOC: FBI, Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Energy (DOE), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Manage criminal investigation. Establish Joint Information Center (JIC). State and local agencies and FEMA ensure coordination of consequence management activities.</td>
<td>FBI; other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, local EM representatives, FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, and other Federal Response Plan (FRP) agencies, as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. DEST provides assistance to FBI SAC. Merges into JOC, as appropriate.</td>
<td>DEST: DOD, DOJ, HHS, FEMA, EPA, and DOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. FEMA representative coordinates Consequence Management Group. Expedites Federal consequence management activities and monitors crisis management response to advise on areas of decision that could impact consequence management response.</td>
<td>FBI, FEMA, EPA, DOD, DOE, HHS, and other FRP agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Crisis management response activities to incident may continue.</td>
<td>FBI, Incident Command System (ICS), Special Operations, Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU), Joint Technical Operations Team, Joint Inter-Agency Intelligence Support (JIIS), and additional authorities, as needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>Participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Federal response efforts coordinated and mission assignments determined. A consequence management support team deploys to incident site. All EOCs coordinate.</td>
<td>ROC and regional-level agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. An Emergency Response Team - Advance Element (ERT-A) deploys to State EOC and incident site, as needed. Base installation sites identified for mobilization centers. Liaisons from WMD-related agencies requested for Emergency Support Team (EST), and ROC. Disaster Field Office (DFO) liaisons as needed (may be after extended response phase).</td>
<td>ERT-A: REGIONAL-LEVEL FEMA AND FRP PRIMARY SUPPORT AGENCIES, AS NEEDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. A consequence management support team provides operational technical assistance to Unified Command (UC).</td>
<td>FEMA, DOE, DOD, HHS, EPA, and FBI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Recovery operations. Transition of LFA from FBI to FEMA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{a}\) FEMA may initiate FRP response prior to any FBI/SIOC notification.

**B. Organization**

1. **Functional Organization – The Northwood EOC Organization Chart**, details the overall response structure of the Northwood EOC involving the threat of or actual occurrence of a terrorist incident in the Town of Northwood. Direction and control remains the responsibility of the elected officials, with implementation and coordination conducted by Emergency Management.

2. The State Homeland Security Advisor, as the title indicates, will advise and provide guidance to the Town Officials or their designee regarding the State’s response to a potential threat or actual occurrence of a terrorist incident.

3. **Interagency Coordination**

Under the Basic Plan of the Northwood EOP, EMC is responsible to ensure that emergency response tasks/activities are coordinated among all the ESFs/response agencies and across all levels of government, as appropriate.
Figure 9 below illustrates the coordination relationships that will be involved during a response to a terrorist incident.

**Figure 9 - Interagency Coordination Relationships**

4. **Specialized Teams/Units**
   a. **NH National Guard WMD – Civil Support Team (CST)** – A team of Reservists and other military personnel
   b. **Regional HazMat Teams** – The State of New Hampshire has established 10 regional teams whose skills and resources could be used to mitigate the affects of a terrorist incident in the State.

5. **Operational Facilities/Sites**
   a. **FBI – Joint Operations Center (JOC)** – A centralized operations center established by the FBI Field Office/Resident Agent during terrorism-related incidents to provide a single point of direction, control, and coordination for emergency response operations. The JOC resolves conflicts in prioritization of resource allocations involving Federal assets.

      1) The location of the JOC will be based upon the location of the incident and current threat specific information.
b. **Joint Information Center (JIC)** - A combined public information center that serves two or more levels of government or Federal, State, and local agencies. During a terrorist incident, the FBI will establish and maintain this facility.

**C. Warning**

1. Every incident is different. There may or may not be warning of a potential WMD incident. Factors involved range from intelligence gathered from various law enforcement or intelligence agency sources to an actual notification from the terrorist organization or individual.

2. The warning or notification of a potential WMD terrorist incident could come from many sources; therefore, open but secure communication among local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies and emergency response officials is essential.

3. The local FBI Field Office/Resident Agent will be notified of any suspected terrorist threats or incidents in the State of New Hampshire.

4. The FBI will notify State and local law enforcement officials regarding potential terrorism threats.
D. Notification and Activation

1. Upon receiving information from the FBI of a potential terrorist threat, the NH State Police/Office of the Attorney General, based on the advise of the FBI, will notify the Homeland Security Advisor and the appropriate State and Local agencies as the situation warrants.

2. The EMC will partially/fully activate the Northwood EOC, based upon specific threat information received. The decision to partially/fully activate the EOC will be based on the advice of the Homeland Security Advisor for New Hampshire.

3. The State EOC will be fully activated upon the receipt of information that the US Department of Homeland Security (US DHS) has raised the threat level to RED.

4. In the event the threat level is raised to Orange, the EOC would be activated upon receipt of threat-specific information (e.g., governmental facilities are being targeted)

5. Based upon the information received, the EMC will determine the operational level of the EOC and notify the Primary and/or Support Agencies for each of ESFs, as appropriate.

E. Communications

1. ESF-2, Communications and Alerting is tasked with the responsibility to establish and maintain a secure communications capability for the Town, which includes voice, data, video, and fax.

2. Under the State EOP ESF-2, Communications and Alerting will coordinate measures to ensure communications interoperability among the response agencies.

F. Plan Implementation

1. Response Actions (Local and State)
   a. Town Lead Agencies’ assignments for Response Actions are the Police, Fire and Emergency Management for general threats or acts of terrorism within the Town of Northwood.

   b. Response actions specific to certain types of terrorist acts can require a shared lead responsibility with additional Town and State agencies, which have the skills and resources that can assist in defining, responding to, and managing the event. Such shared responsibilities would be:

      i. Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, and food and product tampering terrorist acts the shared lead is with Health Department.
ii. Chemical, Incendiary and Explosive terrorist acts shared lead is the Fire Department and State Fire Marshal’s Office.

iii. Agro-terrorism shared lead is the Health Department and State Department of Agriculture, Markets and Food.

iv. Cyber-Terrorism shared lead is the Emergency Management Department and the State Department of Administrative Services, Division of Information Management.

2. **Response Actions (Federal)**
   a. Upon determining that a terrorist incident is credible, the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC), through the FBI Headquarters, will initiate liaison with other Federal agencies to activate their operations centers. The responsible FEMA region(s) may activate a Regional Operations Center (ROC) and deploy a representative(s) to the affected State(s). When the responsible FEMA region(s) activates a ROC, the region(s) will notify the responsible FBI Field Office(s) to request a liaison. If the FBI activates the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters, then other Federal agencies, including FEMA, will deploy a representative(s) to the SIOC, as required. Once the FBI has determined the need to activate a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to support the incident site, Federal, State, and local agencies may be requested by FEMA to support the Consequence Management Group located at the JOC.

3. **Recovery Actions**
   a. EMC shall ensure that the Northwood EOP is adequate to recover from the consequences of terrorism.

   b. EMC, with the support of all agencies in the Northwood EOP, shall act in support of the response teams.

   c. EMC retains responsibility for recovery actions throughout the Local response.

   d. It is the policy of Northwood Emergency Management to use the Northwood EOP structures to coordinate all local assistance to Federal, State, and local governments for recovery actions.
G. Incident Phases

1. **Pre-Incident**
   a. A credible or significant threat may be presented in verbal, written, intelligence-based or other form.

   b. In response to a credible or significant threat involving CBRNE/WMD/Cyber- or Agro-terrorism, the NH State Police and the Attorney General’s Office initiates a threat assessment process that involves close coordination with Local, State and Federal agencies with technical expertise, in order to determine the viability of the threat from a technical, as well as tactical and behavioral standpoint.

   c. The NH State Police maintains contact listing of law enforcement, State and Federal agencies and provides the initial notification to other State law enforcement authorities, State agencies as well as the FBI of a threat or occurrence of terrorism.

   d. Local requests for assistance from other State and Federal agencies will be coordinated through the State EOC. During the course of a threat assessment, consequences may become imminent or occur that cause the Governor to direct STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT to implement in part or in total the actions as described in this Annex.

   e. The FBI operates with a four-tier threat level system that can be used as a basis for initiating precautionary actions when a WMD terrorist event is anticipated. **Figure 10** provides a comparison of the NH Operational Levels with the FBI Threat Levels and identifies the associated State and Federal actions for each level, respectively.

   i. **Level Four (Minimal Threat).** Received threats do not warrant actions beyond normal liaison notifications or placing assets or resources on a heightened alert.

   ii. **Level Three (Potential Threat).** Intelligence or an articulated threat indicates the potential for a terrorist incident; however, this threat has not yet been assessed as credible.

   iii. **Level Two (Credible Threat).** A threat assessment indicates that a potential threat is credible and confirms the involvement of WMD in a developing terrorist incident. The threat increases in significance when the presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event or prior or actual injury or loss
is confirmed or when intelligence and circumstances indicate a high probability that a device exists.

iv. Level One (WMD Incident). A WMD terrorism incident resulting in mass casualties has occurred that requires immediate Federal planning and preparation to provide support to State and local authorities. The Federal response is primarily directed toward the safety and welfare of the public and the preservation of human life.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Hampshire Operational Levels</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Associated State Actions</th>
<th>FBI Threat Levels</th>
<th>Associated Federal Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal Operations</td>
<td>Consist of the daily operations agencies must carry out, in absence of an emergency situation, to ensure readiness.</td>
<td>Preparedness, planning, training, and exercise activities are being conducted.</td>
<td>Level 4 – Minimal Threat</td>
<td>Received threat does not warrant actions beyond normal liaison notifications or placing assets on higher alert status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Condition (Green)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Level 1</td>
<td>Monitoring phase triggered by the potential for an event that could threaten life, property, or the environment.</td>
<td>State agencies and ESFs that would need to take action, as part of their everyday responsibilities will be notified. The EOC will be staffed with EM/ESF personnel.</td>
<td>Level 3 – Potential Threat</td>
<td>Intelligence indicates potential for terrorist incident, but not deemed credible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarded Condition (Blue)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevated Condition (Yellow)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Level 2</td>
<td>Partial activation of the EOC. Triggered by highly probable hazardous conditions and a strong potential for property damage or loss of life.</td>
<td>All ESF primary agencies are notified. The EOC is staffed with assigned personnel and the necessary ESFs.</td>
<td>Level 2 – Credible Threat</td>
<td>Confirms involvement of WMD in developing terrorist incident. State and local law enforcement notified. Federal assets pre-deployed as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Condition (Orange)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Level 3</td>
<td>Full activation of the EOC. Triggered by extremely hazardous conditions that are imminent or occurring. Highest state of alert.</td>
<td>All primary and support agencies under the State EOP are notified. The EOC will be on full activation with 24-hour staffing by assigned personnel and all necessary ESFs.</td>
<td>Level 1 – Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident</td>
<td>Federal resources deployed to augment State and local operations, JOC/JIC activated, EOC fully activated, State liaisons in JOC/JIC as required, Unified Command established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Condition (Red)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 10 - Alignment of Operational Levels with FBI Threat Levels*
2. **Trans Incident**
   a. The NH State Police will contact State and Federal agencies and provides the initial notification to other State law enforcement authorities, state agencies as well as the FBI of the confirmed presence of an explosive device, WMD, Cyber- or Agro-terrorism threat, capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or property loss (e.g., a significant threat).

   b. If an act of terrorism becomes imminent, and causes the Governor to direct STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT to implement a State EOP, then STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT will initiate procedures to notify targeted communities, activate additional ESFs and a Disaster Field Office (DFO) if necessary. Coordination will be conducted from the designated State facility.

   c. As the situation warrants, the EMC will coordinate with the Elected Officials or his/her designee regarding the need to activate the Town’s Continuity of Operations (COOP) and/or Continuity of Government (COG) plans, as appropriate.

3. **Post Incident**
   a. An incident is defined as follows:

      The detonation of an explosive device, utilization of a CBRNE WMD, introduction of an Agro-terrorism agent or other destructive event, with or without warning, that results in limited injury or death (e.g., limited consequences / State and local response and recovery).

      Or the detonation of an explosive device, utilization of a CBRNE WMD, introduction of an Agro-terrorism agent or other destructive event, with or without warning, that results in substantial injury or death (e.g., major consequences / Federal response).

   b. Once an incident has occurred, STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT will provide a Liaison to the respective local EOC and/or the FBI JOC, as needed.

   c. The NH State Police will contact local, State, and Federal agencies of the detonation of an explosive device, using a CBRNE WMD, introduction of an Agro-terrorism agent or other destructive event.

   d. It is feasible to have recovery operations begin while response operations are continuing. STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT will coordinate with the appropriate local, State, and Federal agencies in determining when recovery operations will
Recovery operations include, but are not limited to, the following activities/functions:

(i) Site Decontamination  
(ii) Site Demolition or Restoration  
(iii) Memorial Services  
(iv) Victim Compensation and Disaster Assistance  
(v) Temporary Housing Assistance  
(vi) Long-term Medical Monitoring and Surveillance

e. The Northwood Police Department through the NH State Police will coordinate with the FBI to determine the appropriate point at which, the scene will transition from the response and search and rescue phase to a criminal investigation phase.

f. The Northwood Police Department in conjunction with the NH State Police will coordinate with DOJ to initiate victim assistance programs, as appropriate.

4. **Deactivation**

a. If an act of terrorism does not occur, the responding elements will deactivate when the EMC, in consultation with the State, issues a cancellation notification to the appropriate ESF agencies. ESF agencies will coordinate with the EOC Operations Officer and deactivate according to established SOPs/SOGs.

b. If an act of terrorism occurs, then each ESF structure deactivates at the appropriate time according to established SOPs/SOGs. Following ESF deactivation, operations by individual State agencies may continue, in order to support the affected local governments with long-term hazard monitoring, environmental decontamination, and site restoration (clean-up).

**H. Protective Actions**

1. Evacuation may be required from inside the perimeter of the scene to guard against further casualties from contamination by primary release of a WMD agent, the possible release of additional WMD, secondary devices, or additional attacks targeting emergency responders. Temporary in-place sheltering may be appropriate if there is a short-duration release of hazardous materials or if it is determined to be safer for individuals to remain in place.

2. Protection from biological threats may involve coercive or non-coercive protective actions, including isolation of individuals who pose an infection...
hazard, quarantine of affected locations, vaccination, use of masks by the public, closing of public transportation, limiting public gatherings, and limiting intercity travel. As with any emergency, local officials are primarily responsible for making protective action decisions affecting the public. Protocols should be established to ensure that persons with the proper decision-making authority make important decisions. The Terrorism Annex should include provision for coordinating protective actions with other affected jurisdictions. Planning should also address ways of countering irrational public behavior that can hinder protective actions. Keep in mind, that planning for evacuation should be flexible to account for difficult situations.

I. Resource Management

1. The following considerations are highly relevant to WMD incidents and should be addressed, if appropriate, in one or more appendixes to a resource management annex:

   a. Nuclear, biological, and chemical response resources that may be available through interjurisdictional agreements (e.g., interstate compacts).

   b. Unique resources that may be available through State authorities (e.g., National Guard units).

   c. Unique resources that are available to State and local jurisdictions through Federal authorities (e.g., the Strategic National Stockpile, a national asset providing delivery of antibiotics, antidotes, and medical supplies to the scene of a WMD incident).

   d. Unique expertise that may be available through academic, research, or private organizations.

   e. Trained and untrained volunteer resources and unsolicited donated goods that arrive at the incident site.

J. Roles and Responsibilities

1. The Northwood Police, Fire and Emergency Management are the primary agencies to implement and coordinate the response functions. Specifically, those responsibilities are:

   a. Lead agency for coordination of DOJ Grant Programs.

   b. Serves as the primary state agency for criminal activity, investigations, and prosecution.

   c. Works closely with DOJ, FBI, and State Police with respect to terrorist acts.
d. Provides liaison personnel to the State EOC at terrorist incidents.

2. The Northwood Police Department Police is the primary agency in implementing and coordinating response functions. Specifically, those responsibilities are:

   a. Coordinating the town wide threat assessment.
   b. Working closely with the State Police in assessing threats.
   c. Assisting the State Police and FBI with crime scene management.
   d. Serving as the lead agency for ordinance control and mitigation.
   e. Participating in EOC/ESF operations, as outlined in the Northwood EOP.
   f. Implementing Response Actions (Attorney General, State Police).

   (i) During the response, the NH State Police coordinates closely with local law enforcement authorities and other State agencies for law enforcement resolution.
   (ii) If Federal agencies are involved, then the State Police also coordinates with them. State Police are responsible for the incident site and may modify its Command Post to function as a Joint Operations Center (JOC).
   (iii) The JOC structure includes the following standard groups:
       Command
       Operations
       Support
       Recovery
   (iv) Representation within the JOC may include Federal, State, and local agencies with support roles. Selected Federal, State, and local agencies may be requested to serve in the JOC Command Group, the JOC Support group/Media component, and the JOC Recovery Management Group (see Figure 11, shaded area).
   (v) To maintain consistency in the management of the incident the JOC should continue to operate as structured, however, leadership of the JOC may pass to FBI dependent on the situation. State Police and state agencies in support of the JOC will continue to operate, but under FBI role designation and direction.
   (vi) Response issues that affect multiple agency authorities and areas of expertise will be discussed by the FBI and the JOC Command
Group working in consultation with local, State and Federal representatives. While the FBI on-scene commander (OSC) retains authority to make Federal response decisions at all times, operational decisions are made cooperatively to the greatest extent possible.

(vii) The FBI OSC and the senior FEMA official will provide, or obtain resolution of conflicts in priorities for allocation of critical Federal resources between response and recovery requirements.

**Figure 11 - Joint Operations Center Structure**

3. EMC is the primary agency to implement and coordinate recovery functions. Specifically, those responsibilities are:

   a. Coordinates consequence management activities at the Local level.

   b. Activate Northwood EOP and designated ESFs.

   c. Works closely with State and Federal agencies for impact services.

   d. Based on the circumstances, the Northwood EOC with specifically requested ESFs maybe activated and the Northwood EOP implemented to support the situation. EMC and other Town agencies as needed maybe deployed to the Town EOC to provide assistance.
e. If the Town EOC is operational, and the situation progresses with community impact becoming imminent, then the STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Operations Officer may request a liaison from the response management group be present to ensure adequate communications are maintained throughout the incident.

f. If an incident occurs without warning that produces major community impact and appears to be caused by an act of terrorism, then EMC and the Police Department will initiate required actions concurrently. EMC will consult immediately with the STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT to determine an appropriate course of action and if State and Federal assistance is required. If the Governor directs STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT to implement the State EOP, then STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT will implement portions of this attachment and other ESFs as required. STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT will support the Response Management Team, as required.

4. **Emergency Support Functions Specific to Terrorism Response**

a. **General**

1) Upon activation of Northwood EOP (either in whole or in part), Town agencies/organizations designated as a Primary, and/or Support Agency for the ESFs will effectively carry out their missions and assigned roles and responsibilities, as directed/requested.

2) All of the ESFs will provide support within the scope of their agencies’ statutory authority and assigned mission.

3) This section only outlines those ESFs that have roles and responsibilities specific to a response to terrorism incident. These roles and responsibilities are in addition to those outlined in the Basic Plan and ESF-specific components of the Northwood EOP.

b. **ESF-2, Communications and Alerting**

1) Establish and maintain a secure communications capability to include voice, video, data, and fax.

2) Establish and maintain the security and integrity of the Town’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure.
c. **ESF-4, Fire Fighting**  

1) Coordinate additional assistance and resources from unimpacted jurisdictions to include but not limited to the following:  

a) Detection and monitoring equipment  
b) Decontamination equipment and supplies

d. **ESF-6, Mass Care and Shelter**  

1) Coordinate with ESF-13, Law Enforcement and Security regarding the following:  

a) Victim interviews  
b) Information and/or description of perpetrator

e. **ESF-8, Health and Medical Services**  

1) Coordinate the provision of decontamination assistance to hospitals, first responders and, when necessary, private facilities.  

2) Assist in the overall management, response, and recovery of terrorist incidents involving radiological materials, to include:  

a) Detection, recovery, and disposal of on-scene radioactive debris  
b) Identification of isotope(s)  
c) Plume projections  
d) Recommendations on protective actions  
e) Determination of health risk/consequences to the public and first responders.

3) Assume the lead town role in the response and recovery of a biological terrorist incident, to include:  

a) Disease control and prevention.  
b) Epidemiological investigation.  
c) Quarantine and isolation.  
d) Identification of the biological agent.  
e) Secure laboratory services.  
f) Dispersal of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
g) Management of immunization clinics.

4) Assist the Medical Examiner's Office in the proper disposition of contaminated human remains, clothing and miscellaneous items, as needed.

5) Assist in the efforts to ensure there is no uptake of chemical, radiological or biological agents into the food chain or the food supply.

6) Coordinate with the State Department of Health to implement:
   
b) Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and Point of Distribution (POD) plans and procedures.
c) Mass Prophylaxis Plan.
d) The Smallpox Vaccination Plan, as appropriate.
e) The Influenza Pandemic Plan, as appropriate.

f. **ESF-10, Hazardous Materials**

1) Establish decontamination of contaminated victims and emergency response personnel.

2) Provide detection and monitoring services, equipment and personal protective equipment (PPE), as needed.

3) Establish and maintain environmental health hazards remediation, as needed.


g. **ESF-12, Energy**

Establish and maintain the security and integrity of the town’s energy infrastructure.

h. **ESF-13, Law Enforcement and Security**

1) Disseminate threat information with designated ESFs and other town agencies/organizations, as appropriate.

2) Provide training to emergency response personnel (to include hospital personnel) that includes but is not limited to the following:

   a) Crime scene preservation.
   b) Evidence collection and chain of custody.
   c) Victim interviews.
   d) Combined epidemiological/criminal investigations.
3) Coordinate with ESF-2, Communications and Alerting regarding tracing/investigating Cyber-terrorist attacks and securing affecting sites.

4) Coordinate with ESF-10, Hazardous Materials to ensure scene safety, as needed.

5) Coordinate with ESF-6, Mass Care and Shelter to provide information about a potential perpetrator of a terrorist incident.

6) Coordinate with ESF-8, Health and Medical Services regarding epidemiological/criminal investigations for bioterrorism, nuclear, and radiological terrorism incidents.

7) Coordinate with ESF-16, Animal Health regarding epidemiological/criminal investigations for incidents involving Agro-Terrorism.

8) Coordinate with the Department of Justice – Victim Advocate Services, to provide assistance and support to victims of a terrorist incident.

9) Coordinate with the Department of Justice – Victim Compensation, to provide monetary assistance to victims of a terrorist incident.

i. **ESF-14, Public Information**

   1) Serve as primary public information source until event is classified as a terrorist act and media releases are assumed by Joint Operations Center (JOC) Media operations.

   2) Liaison with the JOC Media/Public Information Officer (PIO) and assist as needed/directed regarding the collection and dissemination of public information.

   3) Assist JOC in keeping media and public informed through JOC designated and approved briefings and press conferences.

   4) Transition to the PIO/JIC operations to the FBI JIC, as required.

j. **ESF-16, Animal Health**

   1) Assess the scope, magnitude, and extent of the CBRNE/Agro-Terrorism incident.
2) Implement plans and procedures to prevent, contain, and/or mitigate the chemical, biological, or radiological agent introduced into the agricultural and livestock environment.

3) In the event, an Agro-Terrorism incident involves a zoonotic disease, coordinate with ESF-8, Health and Medical Services to address the public health risks and for the dissemination of emergency public health information/personal protective actions that may be necessary.

4) Coordinate with ESF-10, Hazardous Materials to ensure safe entry to the incident site, as necessary.

5) Coordinate with ESF-13, Law Enforcement and Security regarding epidemiological/criminal investigations, as needed.
IV. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

1. There are many factors that make consequence management response to a terrorist incident unique. Unlike some natural disasters (hurricanes, floods, winter storms, drought, etc.), the administration and logistics for response to a terrorist incident require special considerations. For example, there may be little or no forewarning, and because the release of a WMD may not be immediately apparent, caregivers, emergency response personnel, and first responders are in imminent danger of becoming casualties before the actual identification of the crime can be made. Incidents could escalate quickly from one scene to multiple locations and jurisdictions.

2. The types of supplies that are needed to respond to a terrorist incident may differ from those needed for a natural disaster or other type of technological emergency. For example, the responders to the September 11, 2001, incidents needed hard hats, steel-toed shoes, respirators that were appropriate for the hazards, and other personal protective equipment; these were not stockpiled and will need to be purchased. The Local EOP should address administrative protocols to ensure that proper purchasing procedures are followed and that duplicate purchases are avoided.

3. Normal transportation routes may not be available for a period time after a terrorist incident has occurred (e.g., commercial airlines), which could delay the arrival of needed supplies and/or State and Federal support. Consideration should be given to regional warehousing of supplies and equipment for emergency responders, including equipment for use of Urban Search and Rescue task forces.

4. One of the key logistical problems in the initial stages of emergency response to a terrorist incident is the establishment of an Incident Command Post (ICP) from which to direct response activities. Because of the unique nature of terrorist activity and the inherent unpredictability of the incident, planners and emergency responders may need to rethink the protocol for locating the ICP. One of the key administrative and logistical challenges in managing the emergency response to the consequences of a terrorist incident is the successful integration of the State and Federal response into the initial response by local emergency response organizations.

5. The very nature of a terrorist incident assumes a State and Federal response. Depending on the extent of the terrorist incident, State and Federal response could be swift and massive. The application, integration, and coordination of the Federal resources into the existing local command and control structure can be a sensitive operation. State and Federal resources should not overwhelm the local response but should be made available as needed and requested. Local planners should involve State and Federal agencies in their planning process, to the extent possible, so as
to develop a better understanding among all parties regarding the nature and extent of the State and Federal response, including the logistical support needs of State and Federal agencies.

6. Planners should be aware of the potential logistical problems that may be caused by the unsolicited influx of volunteers and donated goods. Site and perimeter control is extremely important to avoid responder casualties and to prevent emergency operations from being disrupted by uncontrolled movements of such volunteers. In preparing the Terrorism Annex, planners should be aware of the need to coordinate volunteer activities and storage of donated goods. Planners may want to consider an early public information message requesting volunteers to stay home unless requested and encouraging cash donations rather than unsolicited goods.

7. In developing plans and procedures for terrorist incidents in urban centers, planners will need to identify potential staging areas for personnel and equipment and warehouses for materials, equipment, and supplies. Although these may not be needed for small-scale terrorist incidents, an inventory of available warehouse space and potential staging areas would assist in the response to a large-scale and/or prolonged consequence management response and recovery effort.

V. AUTHORITIES & REFERENCES

A. Plans

2. New Hampshire Planning and Disaster Reference.
8. Presidential Decision Directive 39 (classified). An unclassified extract may be obtained from FEMA.
9. FBI Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan (classified). An unclassified version may be obtained from the FBI.
10. FBI Nuclear Incident Contingency Plan (classified). An unclassified version may be obtained from the FBI.
11. PDD-39 Domestic Guidelines (classified). An unclassified version is included in Tab C.
B. Standard Operating Procedures/Guides (SOPs/SOGs)/Checklists

1. New Hampshire State Coordinating Officer Handbook
2. New Hampshire Initial Assessment Team (IAT) Handbook
5. PDD-39 Domestic Guidelines (classified)
6. Alert and Notification SOG
7. Activation and Deactivation SOG
8. Position Checklists
9. Position Descriptions
10. Secure Communications Procedures
11. Emergency Alert System (EAS)
12. Federal-State Interoperability SOG
13. Emergency Personnel Contact SOP

VI. ATTACHMENTS

A. Forms

1. Chronological Event Log
2. Incident Report
3. Status Report
4. Message Form
5. EM Emergency Shift Change
6. Local Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) Shift Schedule
7. Federal / State Point of Contact Worksheet

NOTE: All forms are bound separately and are located in the Town EOC.
A. **Department of Homeland Security (DHS)**

The Department of Homeland Security (Department) was established by Executive Order 13228 on October 8, 2001. Its mission is to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States. The Department is to perform the functions necessary to carry out this mission. The Department has functions in the areas of national strategy, detection, preparedness, prevention, protection, response and recovery, incident management, continuity of government, and public affairs. In addition, the Department is to invite and encourage State and local governments to participate in carrying out its functions. In performing its functions, the Department is to work with State and local agencies as appropriate.

The functions of the Department that relate most directly to consequence management planning by State and local agencies are in the preparedness, protection, and response and recovery areas. In the preparedness area, the Department is to coordinate national efforts to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of terrorist threats or attacks within the United States. More specifically, the Department’s preparedness functions include coordinating domestic exercises and simulations designed to assess and practice using systems that would be called upon to respond to a terrorist threat or attack and coordinating Federal assistance to State and local authorities and nongovernmental organizations to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats or attacks.

In the protection area, the Department is to coordinate efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks. More specifically, the Department’s protection functions include developing criteria for reviewing whether appropriate security measures are in place at major public and privately owned facilities and coordinating efforts to protect critical public and privately owned information systems.

In the response and recovery area, the Department’s functions include coordinating efforts to ensure rapid restoration of critical infrastructure facilities and critical information systems after disruption by a terrorist attack; coordinating Federal plans and programs to provide medical, financial, and other assistance to victims of terrorist attacks and their families; and coordinating containment and removal of biological, chemical, radiological, explosive, or other hazardous materials in the event of a terrorist threat or attack involving such hazards and coordinating efforts to mitigate the effects of such an attack.

B. **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for consequence management and acts in support of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) in Washington, D.C., and on the scene of the crisis until the
U.S. Attorney General transfers the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) role to FEMA.
Though State and local officials bear primary responsibility for consequence
management, FEMA coordinates the Federal aspects of consequence management
in the event of a terrorist act. Under Presidential Decision Directive 39, FEMA
supports the overall LFA by operating as the lead agency for consequence
management until the overall LFA role is transferred to FEMA and in this
capacity determines when consequences are “imminent” for purposes of the
Stafford Act (Source: Federal Response Plan Terrorism Incident Annex, April
1999). Consequence management includes protecting the public health and safety
and providing emergency relief to State governments, businesses, and individuals.
Additional information on Federal response is given in the United States
Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan
(http://www.fema.gov/r-n-r/conplan/).

Web site: www.fema.gov

1. **Office of National Preparedness (ONP).** The ONP develops and
   implements strategies for FEMA involvement in terrorism-related
   activities and coordinates overall relationships with other Federal
departments and agencies involved in the consequence management
response to terrorism-related activities.

2. **Readiness, Response and Recovery (RRR).** The Readiness, Response
   and recovery Directorate is responsible for planning, training, conducting
   exercises, and leadership in the Federal consequence management
response to terrorist events. The RRR Directorate develops and produces
terrorism consequence management planning guidance for state and local
governments, manages the terrorism consequence management planning
assistance used by State and local governments for terrorism preparedness,
and, in accordance with the Federal Response Plan (FRP), manages
Federal activities required to support State and local governments in the
aftermath of a terrorist incident. The RRR directorate’s terrorism-related
FRP functions include these:

   a. It is responsible for planning, coordination, and operations related
to national security special events.

   b. It provides training for emergency managers, firefighters, and
elected officials in consequence management through the
Emergency Management Institute (EMI), National Fire Academy
(NFA), and National Emergency Training Center (NETC) in
Emmitsburg, Maryland.

   c. EMI offers courses for first responders dealing with the
consequences of terrorist incidents through the Comprehensive
Exercise Program. These exercises provide the opportunity to test
the ability of different levels of response to interact effectively.
d. It manages the Rapid Response Information System, which inventories physical assets and equipment available to State and local officials and provides a database of chemical and biological agents and safety precautions.

3. **Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA).** FIMA is responsible for FEMA’s mitigation programs, which seek to minimize damages and losses from all hazards, including terrorist attacks. The Building Process Assistance Teams, made up of engineering and construction professionals, help by providing thorough analyses of structures as well as information that can be used by communities as they rebuild. Mitigation programs also provide a variety of technical services, including verified and validated airborne and waterborne hazardous material models. FIMA is also responsible for developing new, technologically advanced, remote sensing capabilities needed to assess the release and dispersion of hazardous materials, both in air and water, for guiding consequence management response activities.

4. **U.S. Fire Administration (USFA).** USFA provides training to firefighters and other first responders through the NFA in conjunction with the Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate. The NFA offers courses pertaining to preparedness and response to terrorist events.

5. **Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO).** This Office focuses on strategic and external matters regarding information technology, including e-government, homeland security, and cyber security.

C. **Department of Justice (DOJ)**

Web site: [www.usdoj.gov](http://www.usdoj.gov)

1. **Federal Bureau of Investigation.** The FBI is the lead agency for crisis management and investigation of all terrorism-related matters, including incidents involving a WMD. Within FBI’s role as LFA, the FBI Federal On-Scene Commander (OSC) coordinates the overall Federal response until the Attorney General transfers the LFA role to FEMA.

Web site: [www.fbi.gov](http://www.fbi.gov)

a. **FBI Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section (DTCTPS).** Within the FBI Counter Terrorism Division is a specialized section containing the Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Countermeasures Unit, and the Special Event Management Unit. Each of these units has specific responsibilities in investigations of crimes or allegations of crimes committed by individuals or groups in violation of the Federal terrorism and/or Weapons of Mass Destruction statutes. The DTCTPS serves as the point of contact (POC) to the FBI field offices and command structure as well as other Federal agencies in
incidences of terrorism, the use or suspected use of WMD and/or the evaluation of threat credibility. If the FBI’s Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) is operational for exercises or actual incidents, the DTCTPS will provide staff personnel to facilitate the operation of SIOC. During an incident, the FBI DTCTPS will coordinate the determination of the composition of the Domestic Emergency Support Teams (DEST) and/or the Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST). The DTCTPS WMD Operations Unit will coordinate all incidents, wherein a WMD is used.

b. **FBI Laboratory Division.** Within the FBI’s Laboratory Division reside numerous assets, which can deploy to provide assistance in a terrorism/WMD incident. The Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) personnel are highly trained and knowledgeable and are equipped to direct and assist in the collection of hazardous and/or toxic evidence in a contaminated environment. Similarly, the Evidence Response Team Unit (ERTU) is available to augment the local assets and have been trained in the collection of contaminated evidence. The Crisis Response Unit (CRU) is able to deploy to provide communications support to an incident. The Bomb Data Center (BDC) provides the baseline training to public safety bomb disposal technicians in the United States. BDC is the certification and accreditation authority for public safety agencies operating bomb squads and is in possession of equipment and staff that can be deployed to assist in the resolution of a crisis involving suspected or identified explosive devices. The Explosives Unit (EU) has experts who can assist in analyzing the construction of suspected or identified devices and recommend procedures to neutralize those items.

c. **FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG).** CIRG has developed assets that are designed to facilitate the resolution of crisis incidents of any type. Notably, the Crisis Management Unit (CMU), which conducts training and exercises for the FBI and has developed the concept of the Joint Operations Center (JOC), is available to provide on-scene assistance to the incident and integrate the concept of the JOC and the Incident Command System (ICS) to create efficient management of the situation. CIRG coordinates a highly trained group of skilled negotiators who are adroit in techniques to de-escalate volatile situations. The Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) is a tactical asset, trained to function in contaminated or toxic hazard environments, that is available to assist in the management of the incident.

2. **Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP).** This office, within the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), has a State and Local Domestic Preparedness Technical Assistance Program that provides technical assistance in three areas: (1) general technical assistance; (2) State strategy technical assistance, and (3) equipment technical assistance. The purpose of this
program is to provide direct assistance to State and local jurisdictions in enhancing their capacity and preparedness to respond to WMD terrorist incidents. The program goals are to:

a. Enhance the ability of State and local jurisdictions to develop, plan, and implement a program for WMD preparedness; and

b. Enhance the ability of State and local jurisdictions to sustain and maintain specialized equipment.

Technical assistance available from ODP is provided without charge to requesting State or local jurisdiction. The following organizations are eligible for the State and Local Domestic Preparedness Technical Assistance Program:

a. General technical assistance: units and agencies of State and local governments.

b. State strategy technical assistance: State administrative agencies, designated by the governor, under the Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program.

c. Equipment technical assistance: units and agencies of State and local governments that have received ODP funding to acquire specialized equipment.

Web site: [www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/)

d. **General Technical Assistance.** ODP provides general overall assistance to State and local jurisdictions for preparedness to respond to WMD terrorist incidents. This technical assistance includes:

1) Assistance in developing and enhancing WMD response plans.

2) Assistance with exercise scenario development and evaluation.

3) Provision of WMD experts to facilitate jurisdictional working groups.

4) Provision of specialized training.

e. **State Strategy Technical Assistance.** ODP provides assistance to States in meeting the needs assessment and comprehensive planning requirements under ODP’s Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program. Specifically, ODP:
1) Assists States in developing their three-year statewide domestic preparedness strategy.

2) Assists States in utilizing the assessment tools for completion of the required needs and threat assessments.

f. **Equipment Technical Assistance.** ODP provides training by mobile training teams on the use and maintenance of specialized WMD response equipment under ODP’s Domestic Preparedness Equipment Support Program. This assistance will be delivered on site in eligible jurisdictions. Specifically, ODP:

1) Provides training on using, sustaining, and maintaining specialized equipment.

2) Provides training to technicians on maintenance and calibration of test equipment.

3) Provides maintenance and/or calibration of equipment.

4) Assists in refurbishing used or damaged equipment.

D. **Department of Defense (DOD)**

Web site: [www.defenselink.mil](http://www.defenselink.mil)

In the event of a terrorist attack or act of nature on American soil resulting in the release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear material or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) devices, the local law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical personnel who are first to respond may become quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the attack. The Department of Defense (DOD) has many unique war-fighting support capabilities, both technical and operational, that could be used in support of State and local authorities, if requested by FEMA to support and manage the consequences of such a domestic event.

Due to the increasing volatility of the threat and the time sensitivity associated with providing effective support to FEMA in domestic CBRNE incident, the Secretary of Defense appointed an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD[CS]). The ATSD[CS] serves as the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense for the oversight of policy, requirements, priorities, resources, and programs related to the DOD role in managing the consequences of a domestic incident involving the naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear material or high-yield explosives. When requested, the DOD will provide its unique and extensive resources in accordance with the following principles. First, DOD will ensure an unequivocal chain of responsibility, authority, and accountability for its actions to ensure the American people that the military will follow the basic constructs of lawful action when an emergency occurs. Second, in the event of a catastrophic CBRNE event, DOD will always play a supporting role to the LFA in accordance with all applicable...
law and plans. Third, DOD support will emphasize its natural role, skills, and structures to mass mobilize and provide logistical support. Fourth, DOD will purchase equipment and provide support in areas that are largely related to its war-fighting mission. Fifth, reserve component forces are DOD’s forward-deployed forces for domestic consequence management. All official requests for DOD support to CBRNE consequence management (CM) incidents are made by the LFA to the Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense. While the LFA may submit the requests for DOD assistance through other DOD channels, immediately upon receipt, any request that comes to any DOD element shall be forwarded to the Executive Secretary. In each instance the Executive Secretary will take the necessary action so that the Deputy Secretary can determine whether the incident warrants special operational management. In such instances, upon issuance of Secretary of Defense guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CICS), the Joint Staff will translate the Secretary’s decisions into military orders for these CBRNE-CM events, under the policy oversight of the ATSD (CS). If the Deputy Secretary of Defense determines that DOD support for a particular CBRNE-CM incident does not require special consequence management procedures, the Secretary of the Army will exercise authority as the DOD Executive Agent through normal Director of Military Support, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) procedures, with policy oversight by the ATSD (CS). As noted above, DOD assets are tailored primarily for the larger war-fighting mission overseas. But in recognition of the unique challenges of responding to a domestic CBRNE incident, the Department established a standing Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTFCS) headquarters at the United States Joint Forces Command, to plan for and integrate DOD’s consequence management support to the LFA for events in the continental United States. The United States Pacific Command and United States Southern Command have parallel responsibilities for providing military assistance to civil authorities for States, territories, and possessions outside the continental United States. Specific units with skills applicable to a domestic consequence management role can be found in the Rapid Response Information System (RRIS) database maintained by FEMA. Capabilities include detection, decontamination, medical, and logistics.

Additionally, DOD has established 10 Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), each composed of 22 well-trained and equipped full-time National Guard personnel. Upon Secretary of Defense certification, one WMD-CST will be stationed in each of the 10 FEMA regions around the country, ready to provide support when directed by their respective governors. Their mission is to deploy rapidly, assist local responders in determining the precise nature of an attack, provide expert technical advice, and help pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on military assets. By Congressional direction, DOD is in the process of establishing and training an additional 17 WMD-CSTs to support the U.S. population. Interstate agreements provide a process for the WMD-CST and other National Guard assets to be used by neighboring states. If national security requirements dictate, these units may be transferred to Federal service.

**E. Department of Energy (DOE)**
1. Through its Office of Emergency Response, the DOE manages radiological emergency response assets that support both crisis and consequence management response in the event of an incident involving a WMD. The DOE is prepared to respond immediately to any type of radiological accident or incident with its radiological emergency response assets.

2. Through its Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, the DOE coordinates activities in nonproliferation, international nuclear safety, and communicated threat assessment. DOE maintains the following capabilities that support domestic terrorism preparedness and response.

Web site: [www.dp.doe.gov/emergencyresponse/](http://www.dp.doe.gov/emergencyresponse/)

3. **Aerial Measuring System (AMS).** Radiological assistance operations may require the use of aerial monitoring to quickly determine the extent and degree of the dispersal of airborne or deposited radioactivity or the location of lost or diverted radioactive materials. The AMS is an aircraft-operated radiation detection system that uses fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters equipped with state-of-the-art technology instrumentation to track, monitor, and sample airborne radioactive plumes and/or detect and measure radioactive material deposited on the ground. The AMS capabilities reside at both Nellis Air Force Base near Las Vegas, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base near Washington, D.C. The fixed-wing aircraft provide a rapid assessment of the contaminated area, whereas the helicopters provide a slower, more detailed and accurate analysis of the contamination.

   a. For facilities or materials regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), or by an NRC Agreement State, the technical response is led by NRC as the LFA (in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan) and supported by DOE as needed.

4. **Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC).** Radiological assistance operations may require the use of computer models to assist in estimating early phase radiological consequences of radioactive material accidentally released into the atmosphere. The ARAC is a computer-based atmospheric dispersion and deposition modeling capability operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The ARAC’s role in an emergency begins when a nuclear, chemical, or other hazardous material is, or has the potential of being, released into the atmosphere. The ARAC’s capability consists of meteorologists and other technical staff using three-dimensional computer models and real-time weather data to project the dispersion and deposition of radioactive material in the environment. The ARAC’s computer output consists of graphical contour plots showing predicted estimates for instantaneous air and ground contamination levels, air immersion and ground-level exposure rates, and integrated effective dose equivalents for individuals or critical populations. The plots can be overlaid on local maps to assist emergency
response officials in deciding what protective actions are needed to effectively protect people and the environment. Protective actions could impact distribution of food and water sources and include sheltering and evacuating critical population groups. The ARAC’s response time is typically 30 minutes to 2 hours after notification of an incident.

5. **Accident Response Group (ARG).** ARG is DOE’s primary emergency response capability for responding to emergencies involving United States nuclear weapons. The ARG, which is managed by the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office, is composed of a cadre of approximately 300 technical and scientific experts, including senior scientific advisors, weapons engineers and technicians, experts in nuclear safety and high-explosive safety, health physicists, radiation control technicians, industrial hygienists, physical scientists, packaging and transportation specialists, and other specialists from the DOE weapons complex. ARG members will deploy with highly specialized, state-of-the-art equipment for weapons recovery and monitoring operations. The ARG deploys on military or commercial aircraft using a time-phased approach. The ARG advance elements are ready to deploy within four hours of notification. ARG advance elements focus on initial assessment and provide preliminary advice to decision makers. When the follow-on elements arrive at the emergency scene, detailed health and safety evaluations and operations are performed and weapon recovery operations are initiated.

6. **Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC).** For major radiological emergencies impacting the United States, the DOE establishes a FRMAC. The center is the control point for all Federal assets involved in the monitoring and assessment of offsite radiological conditions. The FRMAC provides support to the affected states, coordinates Federal offsite radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities, maintains a technical liaison with Tribal nations and State and local governments, responds to the assessment needs of the LFA, and meets the statutory responsibilities of the participating Federal agency.

7. **Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).** NEST is DOE’s program for dealing with the technical aspects of nuclear or radiological terrorism. A NEST consists of engineers, scientists, and other technical specialists from the DOE national laboratories and other contractors. NEST resources are configured to be quickly transported by military or commercial aircraft to worldwide locations and prepared to respond 24 hours a day using a phased and flexible approach to deploying personnel and equipment. The NEST is deployable within four hours of notification with specially trained teams and equipment to assist the FBI in handling nuclear or radiological threats. Response teams vary in size from a five person technical advisory team to a tailored deployment of dozens of searchers and scientists who can locate and then conduct or support technical operations on a suspected nuclear device. The NEST capabilities include intelligence, communications, search, assessment,
access, diagnostics, render-safe operations, operations containment/damage mitigation, logistics, and health physics.

8. **Radiological Assistance Program (RAP).** Under the RAP, the DOE provides, upon request, radiological assistance to DOE program elements, other Federal agencies, State, Tribal, and local governments, private groups, and individuals. RAP provides resources (trained personnel and equipment) to evaluate, assess, advise, and assist in the mitigation of actual or perceived radiation hazards and risks to workers, the public, and the environment. RAP is implemented on a regional basis, with regional coordination between the emergency response elements of the States, Tribes, other Federal agencies, and DOE. Each RAP Region maintains a minimum of three RAP teams, which are comprised of DOE and DOE contractor personnel, to provide radiological assistance within their region of responsibility. RAP teams consist of volunteer members who perform radiological assistance duties as part of their formal employment or as part of the terms of the contract between their employer and DOE. A fully configured team consists of seven members; to include one Team Leader, one Team Captain, four health physics survey/support personnel, and one Public Information Officer (PIO). A RAP team may deploy with two or more members depending on the potential hazards, risks, or the emergency or incident scenario. Multiple RAP teams may also be deployed to an accident if warranted by the situation.

9. **Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS).** DOE’s Oak Ridge Institute manages the REAC/TS for Science and Education in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The REAC/TS maintains a 24-hour response center staffed with personnel and equipment to support medical aspects of radiological emergencies. The staff consists of physicians, nurses, paramedics, and health physicists who provide medical consultation and advice and/or direct medical support at the accident scene. The REAC/TS capabilities include assessment and treatment of internal and external contamination, whole-body counting, radiation dose estimation, and medical and radiological triage.

10. **Communicated Threat Credibility Assessment.** DOE is the program manager for the Nuclear Assessment Program (NAP) at LLNL. The NAP is a DOE-funded asset specifically designed to provide technical, operational, and behavioral assessments of the credibility of communicated threats directed against the U.S. Government and its interests. The assessment process includes one-hour initial and four-hour final products which, when integrated by the FBI as part of its threat assessment process, can lead to a “go/no go” decision for response to a nuclear threat.

**F. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)**

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as the lead Federal agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 (health and medical services), provides coordinated Federal assistance to supplement State and local resources in
response to public health and medical care needs following a major disaster or emergency. Additionally, HHS provides support during developing or potential medical situations and has the responsibility for Federal support of food, drug, and sanitation issues. HHS operational support to FEMA may include mass immunization, mass prophylaxis, mass fatality management, pharmaceutical support operations (National Pharmaceutical Stockpile), contingency medical records, patient tracking, and patient evacuation and definitive medical care provided through the National Disaster Medical System. Resources are furnished when State and local resources are overwhelmed and public health and/or medical assistance is requested from the Federal government.

HHS, in its primary agency role for ESF #8, coordinates the provision of Federal health and medical assistance to fulfill the requirements identified by the affected State/local authorities having jurisdiction. Included in ESF #8 is overall public health response; triage, treatment, and transportation of victims of the disaster; and evacuation of patients out of the disaster area, as needed, into a network of Military Services, Veterans Affairs, and pre-enrolled non-Federal hospitals located in the major metropolitan areas of the United States. ESF #8 utilizes resources primarily available from (1) within HHS, (2) ESF #8 support agencies, (3) the National Disaster Medical System, and (4) specific non-Federal sources (major pharmaceutical suppliers, hospital supply vendors, international disaster response organizations, and international health organizations). Under federal law, the Secretary of HHS has authority to regulate or prevent travel and shipments of goods between states in order to control the spread of communicable disease, including the authority to apprehend, detain, or conditionally release individuals with particular diseases. Within HHS, CDC has been delegated authority for interstate quarantine over persons, while FDA has regulatory authority over animals and other products that may transmit or spread communicable diseases.

Web site: [www.hhs.gov](http://www.hhs.gov)

1. **Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP).** OEP manages and coordinates Federal health, medical and health-related social service response and recovery to Federally declared disasters under the Federal Response Plan. The major functions of OEP include:

   a. Coordination and delivery of Department-wide emergency preparedness activities, including continuity of government, continuity of operations, and emergency assistance during disasters and other emergencies;

   b. Coordination of the health and medical response of the Federal government, in support of State and local governments, in the aftermath of terrorist acts involving WMD; and

   c. Direction and maintenance of the medical response component of the National Disaster Medical System, including development and operational readiness capability of Disaster Medical Assistance
Teams and other special teams that can be deployed as the primary medical response teams in case of disasters.

2. **Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).** CDC is the Federal agency responsible for protecting the public health of the country through prevention and control of diseases and for response to public health emergencies. CDC works with national and international agencies to eradicate or control communicable diseases and other preventable conditions. The CDC Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program oversees the agency’s effort to prepare State and local governments to respond to acts of bioterrorism. In addition, CDC has designated emergency response personnel throughout the agency who are responsible for responding to biological, chemical, and radiological terrorism. CDC has epidemiologists trained to investigate and control outbreaks or illnesses, as well as laboratories capable of quantifying an individual’s exposure to biological or chemical agents. CDC maintains the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) to respond to terrorist incidents within the United States.

   Web site: [www.cdc.gov](http://www.cdc.gov)

3. **National Disaster Medical System (NDMS).** NDMS is a cooperative asset-sharing partnership between HHS, DOD, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), FEMA, State and local governments, and the private sector. The System has three components: direct medical care, patient evacuation, and the non-Federal hospital bed system. NDMS was created as a nationwide medical response system to supplement State and local medical resources during disasters and emergencies, provide backup medical support to the military and VA health care systems during an overseas conventional conflict, and to promote development of community-based disaster medical service systems. This partnership includes DOD and VA Federal Coordinating Centers, which provide patient beds, as well as 1,990 civilian hospitals. NDMS is also comprised of over 7,000 private-sector medical and support personnel organized into many teams across the nation. These teams and other special medical teams are deployed to provide immediate medical attention to the sick and injured during disasters, when local emergency response systems become overloaded.

   a. **Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT).** A DMAT is a group of professional and paraprofessional medical personnel (supported by a cadre of logistical and administrative staff) designed to provide emergency medical care during a disaster or other event. During a WMD incident, the DMAT provides clean area medical care in the form of medical triage and patient stabilization for transport to tertiary care.

   b. **National Medical Response Team–Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMRTWMD).** The NMRT-WMD is a specialized response force designed to provide medical care following a
nuclear, biological, and/or chemical incident. This unit is capable of providing mass casualty decontamination, medical triage, and primary and secondary medical care to stabilize victims for transportation to tertiary care facilities in a hazardous material environment. There are four such teams geographically dispersed throughout the United States.

c. **Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT).** The DMORT is a mobile team of mortuary care specialists who have the capability to respond to incidents involving fatalities from transportation accidents, natural disasters, and/or terrorist events. The team provides technical assistance and supports mortuary operations, as needed for mass fatality incidents.

**G. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)**

EPA is chartered to respond to WMD releases under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) regardless of the cause of the release. EPA is authorized by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); the Oil Pollution Act; and the Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to-Know Act to support Federal, State, and local responders in counterterrorism.

EPA will provide support to the FBI during crisis management in response to a terrorist incident. In its crisis management role, the EPA On-Scene Commander (OSC) may provide the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) with technical advice and recommendations, scientific and technical assessments, and assistance (as needed) to State and local responders. The EPA OSC will support FEMA during consequence management for the incident. EPA carries out its response according to the FRP, ESF #10, Hazardous Materials. The OSC may request an Environmental Response Team that is funded by EPA if the terrorist incident exceeds available local and regional resources. EPA is the chair for the National Response Team (NRT). The following EPA reference material and planning guidance is recommended for State, Tribal, and local planners:


2. Environmental Protection Agency’s Role in Counterterrorism Activities, 1998 (EPA 550-F-98-014).


Web site: [www.epa.gov](http://www.epa.gov)
H. Department of Agriculture

It is the policy of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to be prepared to respond swiftly in the event of national security, natural disaster, technological, and other emergencies at the national, regional, State, and county levels to provide support and comfort to the people of the United States. USDA has a major role in ensuring the safety of food for all Americans. One concern is bioterrorism and its effect on agriculture in rural America, namely crops in the field, animals on the hoof, and food safety issues related to food in the food chain between the slaughterhouse and/or processing facilities and the consumer.

Web site: www.usda.gov

1. **The Office of Crisis Planning and Management (OCPM).** This USDA office coordinates the emergency planning, preparedness, and crisis management functions and the suitability for employment investigations of the Department. It also maintains the USDA Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP).

2. **USDA State Emergency Boards (SEBs).** The SEBs have responsibility for coordinating USDA emergency activities at the State level.

3. **The Farm Service Agency.** This USDA agency develops and administers emergency plans and controls covering food processing, storage, and wholesale distribution; distribution and use of seed; and manufacture, distribution, and use of livestock and poultry feed.

4. **The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS).** This USDA agency provides food assistance in officially designated disaster areas upon request by the designated State agency. Generally, the food assistance response from FNS includes authorization of Emergency Food Stamp Program benefits and use of USDA-donated foods for emergency mass feeding and household distribution, as necessary. FNS also maintains a current inventory of USDA-donated food held in Federal, State, and commercial warehouses and provides leadership to the FRP under ESF #11, Food.

5. **Food Safety and Inspection Service.** This USDA agency inspects meat/meat products, poultry/poultry products, and egg products in slaughtering and processing plants; assists the Food and Drug Administration in the inspection of other food products; develops plans and procedures for radiological emergency response in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP); and provides support, as required, to the FRP at the national and regional levels.

6. **Natural Resources Conservation Service.** This USDA agency provides technical assistance to individuals, communities, and governments relating to proper use of land for agricultural production; provides assistance in determining the extent of damage to agricultural land and water; and
provides support to the FRP under ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering.

7. **Agricultural Research Service (ARS).** This USDA agency develops and carries out all necessary research programs related to crop or livestock diseases; provides technical support for emergency programs and activities in the areas of planning, prevention, detection, treatment, and management of consequences; provides technical support for the development of guidance information on the effects of radiation, biological, and chemical agents on agriculture; develops and maintains current inventory of ARS controlled laboratories that can be mobilized on short notice for emergency testing of food, feed, and water safety; and provides biological, chemical, and radiological safety support for USDA.

8. **Economic Research Service.** This USDA agency, in cooperation with other departmental agencies, analyzes the impacts of the emergency on the U.S. agricultural system, as well as on rural communities, as part of the process of developing strategies to respond to the effects of an emergency.

9. **Rural Business-Cooperative Service.** This USDA agency, in cooperation with other government agencies at all levels, promotes economic development in affected rural areas by developing strategies that respond to the conditions created by an emergency.

10. **Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.** This USDA agency protects livestock, poultry, crops, biological resources, and products thereof, from diseases, pests, and hazardous agents (biological, chemical, and radiological); assesses the damage to agriculture of any such introduction; and coordinates the utilization and disposal of livestock and poultry exposed to hazardous agents.

11. **Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service (CSREES).** This USDA agency coordinates use of land grant and other cooperating State college, and university services and other relevant research institutions in carrying out all responsibilities for emergency programs. CSREES administers information and education services covering (a) farmers, other rural residents, and the food and agricultural industries on emergency needs and conditions; (b) vulnerability of crops and livestock to the effects of hazardous agents (biological, chemical, and radiological); and (c) technology for emergency agricultural production. This agency maintains a close working relationship with the news media. CSREES will provide guidance on the most efficient procedures to assure continuity and restoration of an agricultural technical information system under emergency conditions.

12. **Rural Housing Service.** This USDA agency will assist the Department of housing and Urban Development by providing living quarters in unoccupied rural housing in an emergency situation.
13. **Rural Utilities Service.** This USDA agency will provide support to the FRP under ESF #12, Energy, at the national level.

14. **Office of Inspector General (OIG).** This USDA office is the Department’s principal law enforcement component and liaison with the FBI. OIG, in concert with appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, is prepared to investigate any terrorist attacks relating to the nation’s agriculture sector, to identify subjects, interview witnesses, and secure evidence in preparation for Federal prosecution. As necessary, OIG will examine USDA programs regarding counterterrorism-related matters.

15. **Forest Service (FS).** This USDA agency will prevent and control fires in rural areas in cooperation with State, local, and Tribal governments, and appropriate Federal departments and agencies. They will determine and report requirements for equipment, personnel, fuels, chemicals, and other materials needed for carrying out assigned duties. The FS will furnish personnel and equipment for search and rescue work and other emergency measures in national forests and on other lands where a temporary lead role will reduce suffering or loss of life. The FS will provide leadership to the FRP under ESF #4, Firefighting, and support to the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), as required, at the national and regional levels. FS will allocate and assign radio frequencies for use by agencies and staff offices of USDA. FS will also operate emergency radio communications systems in support of local, regional, and national firefighting teams. Lastly, the FS law enforcement officers can serve as support to OIG in major investigations of acts of terrorism against agricultural lands and products.

### I. **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, retains Federal lead responsibility for facilities or materials regulated by the NRC or by an NRC Agreement State. The NRC’s counterterrorism-specific role, at these facilities or material sites, is to exercise the Federal lead for radiological safety while supporting other Federal, State and local agencies in Crisis and Consequence Management.

Web site: [www.nrc.gov](http://www.nrc.gov)

1. **Radiological Safety Assessment.** The NRC will provide the facility (or for materials, the user) technical advice to ensure onsite measures are taken to mitigate offsite consequences. The NRC will serve as the primary Federal source of information regarding on-site radiological conditions and off-site radiological effects. The NRC will support the technical needs of other agencies by providing descriptions of devices or facilities containing radiological materials and assessing the safety impact of terrorist actions and of proposed tactical operations of any responders. Safety assessments will be coordinated through NRC liaison at the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), Strategic Information and
Operations Center (SIOC), Command Post (CP), and Joint Operations Center (JOC).

2. **Protective Action Recommendations.** The licensee and State have the primary responsibility for recommending and implementing, respectively, actions to protect the public. They will, if necessary, act, without prior consultation with Federal officials, to initiate protective actions for the public and responders. The NRC will contact State and local authorities and offer advice and assistance on the technical assessment of the radiological hazard and, if requested, provide advice on protective actions for the public. The NRC will coordinate any recommendations for protective actions through NRC liaison at the CP or JOC.

3. **Responder Radiation Protection.** The NRC will assess the potential radiological hazards to any responders and coordinate with the facility radiation protection staff to ensure that personnel responding to the scene are observing the appropriate precautions.

4. **Information Coordination.** The NRC will supply other responders and government officials with timely information concerning the radiological aspects of the event. The NRC will liaison with the Joint Information Center to coordinate information concerning the Federal response.

**J. Department of Labor**

**Occupational Safety and Health Administration.** Under its mandate to help protect the safety and health of workers, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) can provide resources to help protect rescue and recovery workers following a terrorist attack. Activities include monitoring and sampling for hazards, analyzing the resulting air and bulk samples at OSHA’s technical center, and disseminating sampling results; distributing respirators and conducting quantitative fit testing of negative pressure respirators; conducting assessments of the hazards and potential health and safety risks to workers involved in rescue and recovery at a terrorist attack site; distributing hard hats, safety glasses and goggles, gloves, and other personal protective equipment at the site of an explosive or incendiary attack; and inspecting cranes and riggings for hazards.

The Department of Labor can also fund training programs to help protect responders from biological or chemical hazards. Development of an anthrax/biohazard cleanup training program that utilizes OSHA and union expertise has been funded in the wake of the anthrax attacks in the autumn of 2001.
TAB B: HOTLINES AND ONLINE RESOURCES

Note: The Internet sites listed here have been verified and are current as of July 2003

Users of this Tab should be aware that the Internet is a changing environment. New sites are added frequently. Sites also may be relocated or discontinued. Updated information on online resources will be provided through the FEMA web site, http://www.fema.gov.

I. TELEPHONE HOTLINES

A. National Response Center Hotline (800-424-8802) A service that receives reports of oil, chemical, biological and radiological releases and actual or potential domestic terrorism; provides technical assistance to emergency responders; and connects callers with appropriate Federal resources. The hotline operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

B. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center (301-816-5100) (Collect calls accepted). Accepts reports of accidents involving radiological materials.

II. INTERNET REFERENCE ADDRESSES


C. CBIAC: Chemical and Biological Defense Information and Analysis Center http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/. Collects, reviews, analyzes, and summarizes chemical warfare/contraband detection (CW/CBD) information.

D. Chemical and Biological Warfare – Health and Safety http://www.ntis.gov/hs/. Department of Commerce National Technical Information Service (NTIS) site has references for chemical and biological agents, detoxification, decontamination, immunizations, etc.

E. Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO) http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/. Information on the CEPPO office, upcoming events, publications, legislation and regulations, and links to outside resources. Also contains information on accident prevention and risk management planning

F. Chemical Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC) http://www.chemtrec.org. Source of technical assistance from chemical product...
safety specialists, emergency response coordinators, toxicologists and other hazardous materials (HazMat) specialists.

G. **FEMA – Bio, Toxic Agents, and Epidemic Hazards Reference**

H. **FEMA – Emergency Management – Related Bibliography**
   [http://www.fema.gov/rrr/allhzpln6g.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/rrr/allhzpln6g.shtm). Currently 35 links to various emergency management-related bibliographies. At least 10 of these relate to WMD.

I. **FEMA – Rapid Response Information System**
   [http://www.fema.gov/rrr/allhzpln6g.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/rrr/allhzpln6g.shtm). Extensive centralized database that can be used as a reference guide, training aid, and overall planning and training resource for response to a chemical, biological, or nuclear terrorism incident. Comprised of seven databases, consisting of chemical and biological agents’ and radiological materials’ characteristics, first aid measures, Federal response capabilities, training course information, and other Federal information sources concerning potential weapons of mass destruction.

J. **Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan** (available from the National Archives and Records Administration: [http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html](http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html); select 1996 Federal Register, Vol. 61, Notices, May 08, 1996; search on “Radiological Emergency Response”)


L. **Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)**

   1. **Planning Guidance for The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program**

      Selecting “Homeland Defense” provides links to WMD responder training courses.


especially requests for CHPPM services. Links connect to Directorates of Environmental Health Engineering, Health Promotion and Wellness, Laboratory Sciences, Occupational Health, and Toxicology.

N. **U.S. Army Medical Research and Development (R&D) Command**

O. **U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense**

P. **U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases**

II. **CROSS-REFERENCE WEB SITES**

A. **Federal Departments/Agencies**

1. **Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)**
   a. EPA’s Chemical Emergency and Prevention Office (CEPPO). CEPPO provides leadership, advocacy, and assistance to prevent and prepare for chemical emergencies, respond to environmental crises, and inform the public about chemical hazards in their community. [http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/](http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/)
   b. EPA’s Environmental Response Team (ERT). The ERT is a group of skilled experts in environmental emergencies who provide on-scene assistance on a “round-the-clock” basis to deal with environmental disasters. [http://www.ert.org/](http://www.ert.org/)
   c. CEPPO’s Role in Homeland Security. This Web site describes EPA’s counterterrorism efforts and shares relevant counterterrorism information and resources. [http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/cntr-ter.html](http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/cntr-ter.html)

2. **Department of Defense (DOD)**
   a. DOD’s Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center. This Web site is DOD’s focal point for chemical and biological warfare information. [http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/](http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/)
   b. DOD’s Counter proliferation: Chem Bio Defense. This is a DOD “web network” on nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense. [http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/](http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/)

d. **DOD’s Medical (Army Surgeon General).** This Web site contains extensive medical documents, training materials, audiovisual clips, a search engine, and links to other sites. [http://www.nbc-med.org](http://www.nbc-med.org)

3. **Department of Justice (DOJ)**

a. **Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)**

   i) **Awareness of National Security Issues and Response Program (ANSIR).** The ANSIR is the “public voice” of the FBI for espionage, cyber and physical infrastructure protection. [http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/ansir/ansirhome.htm](http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/ansir/ansirhome.htm)

b. **Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP).** ODP provides technical assistance to States and local jurisdictions to enhance their ability to develop, plan, and implement a program for WMD preparedness. [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/)

4. **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**

a. **Backgrounder: Terrorism.** This FEMA Web site provides basic background information on terrorism-related issues. [http://www.fema.gov/hazards/terrorism/terror.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/hazards/terrorism/terror.shtm)

b. **Terrorism Annex to the Federal Response Plan.** The site includes the full text of the Annex in PDF format that can be downloaded and reproduced. [http://www.fema.gov/rrr/allhzpln6g.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/rrr/allhzpln6g.shtm)

c. **United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan.** The link provides the full text of the plan, which is designed to provide information to Federal, State, and local agencies on how the Federal government will respond to potential or actual terrorism threats. The document is in PDF format and can be downloaded and reproduced. [http://www.fema.gov/rrr/conplan/conplan2b.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/rrr/conplan/conplan2b.shtm)

e. **FEMA’s Rapid Response Information System (RRIS).** This Web site provides descriptions and links to eight major chemical and biological agent resources. [http://www.fema.gov/](http://www.fema.gov/)

f. **National Fire Academy.** The National Fire Academy homepage provides links to the course catalog and to specific courses and job aids relating to terrorism preparedness. [http://www.usfa.fema.gov/fire-service/nfa.shtm](http://www.usfa.fema.gov/fire-service/nfa.shtm)

g. **FEMA’s Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-Study Course.** This Web site provides a link to a self-study course designed to provide basic awareness training to prepare first responders to respond safely and effectively to incidents of terrorism. [http://www.usfa.fema.gov](http://www.usfa.fema.gov)

h. **FEMA Emergency Management Institute.** This institute offers a range of courses on managing the emergency consequences of terrorism. [http://www.fema.gov/about/training.shtm](http://www.fema.gov/about/training.shtm)

5. **Department of Health and Human Services**

   a. **Office of Emergency Preparedness / National Disaster Medical System.** The website provides information on current and previous disaster responses, counter terrorism programs and links to other Federal sites. [http://www.oep-ndms.dhhs.gov/](http://www.oep-ndms.dhhs.gov/)

   b. **Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program.** The website provides information on bioterrorism preparedness issues, response planning and recent publications related to bioterrorism. [http://www.bt.cdc.gov/](http://www.bt.cdc.gov/)

   CDC also provides helpful (though not comprehensive) lists of chemical and biological agents that might be used by terrorists. These lists are included in “Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response,” in CDC’s *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report*, April 21, 2000 (Vol. 49, No. RR-4). [http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/mmwr_rr.html](http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/mmwr_rr.html)

   c. **CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).** Web site contains information to help protect the safety and health of emergency responders, such as guidance for supervisors at disaster rescue sites. [http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/emres](http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/emres)

   d. **Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS).** Although the MMRS program is locally controlled, this website provides information which will assist any local, State or Federal planner or responder working with domestic preparedness issues. [http://www.mmrs.hhs.gov/](http://www.mmrs.hhs.gov/)

B. Other Resources


2. DOE Office of Civilian Radiation Waste Management. This Web site provides a range of radiation-related information. http://www.rw.doe.gov/

3. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF). This Web site presents a course developed by IAFF for DOE, called Training for Radiation Emergencies. It is intended for emergency responders who may be called upon to response to radiological transportation incidents. http://tis.eh.doe.gov/fire/fro/fro.html


THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Purpose. To provide an unclassified synopsis of the U.S. national policy on terrorism as laid out in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39.

Background. On June 21, 1995, the President signed PDD-39, *U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism*. This classified document laid out the national policy and assigned specific missions to designated Federal Departments and agencies. This unclassified synopsis is provided to enable Federal, State, and local emergency response and Consequence Management personnel without appropriate security clearances to have a basic understanding of the provisions of PDD-39.

PDD-39 validates and reaffirms existing Federal Lead Agency responsibilities for counterterrorism, which are assigned to the Department of Justice (DOJ), as delegated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for threats or acts of terrorism within the United States. The FBI as the lead for Crisis Management will involve only those Federal agencies required and designated in classified documents. The Directive further states the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the support of all agencies in the Federal Response Plan (FRP), will support the FBI in Washington, DC, and on scene until the Attorney General transfers Lead Agency to FEMA. FEMA retains responsibility for Consequence Management throughout the Federal response.

Definitions. Crisis Management includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response.

Consequence Management includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required.

**US Policy on Counterterrorism**

General. Terrorism is both a threat to our national security as well as a criminal act. The Administration has stated that it is the policy of the United States to use all appropriate means to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks on our territory and resources, both with people and facilities, wherever they occur. In support of these efforts, the United States will:

- Employ efforts to deter, preempt, apprehend, and prosecute terrorists.
- Work closely with other governments to carry out counterterrorism policy and combat terrorist threats against them.
- Identify sponsors of terrorists, isolate them, and ensure they pay for their actions.
- Make no concessions to terrorists.
Measures to Combat Terrorism. To ensure the United States is prepared to combat terrorism in all of its forms, a number of measures have been directed. These include reducing vulnerabilities to terrorism, deterring and responding to terrorist attacks, and having capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons, including those of mass destruction.

a. Reduce Vulnerabilities. In order to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism, both at home and abroad, all departmental/agency heads have been directed to ensure that their personnel and facilities are fully protected against terrorism. Specific efforts that will be conducted to ensure our security against terrorist attacks include the following:

• Review the vulnerability of government facilities and critical national infrastructure.
• Expand the program of counterterrorism.
• Reduce vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel/facilities abroad and military personnel/facilities.
• Reduce vulnerabilities affecting U.S. airports, aircraft/passengers, and shipping and provide appropriate security measures for other modes of transportation.
• Exclude/deport persons who pose a terrorist threat.
• Prevent unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives and protect the President and other officials against terrorist attack.
• Reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to international terrorism through intelligence collection/analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action.

b. Deter. To deter terrorism, it is necessary to provide a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist acts, and we will vigorously deal with terrorists/sponsors to reduce terrorist capabilities and support. In this regard, we must make it clear that we will not allow terrorism to succeed and that the pursuit, arrest, and prosecution of terrorists are of the highest priority. Our goals include the disruption of terrorist sponsored activity, including termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United States. The return of terrorists overseas who are wanted for violation of U.S. law is of the highest priority and a central issue in bilateral relations with any state that harbors or assists them.

c. Respond. To respond to terrorism, we must have a rapid and decisive capability to protect Americans, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to the victims of terrorists. The goal during the immediate response phase of an incident is to terminate terrorist attacks, so the terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain their freedom, while seeking to minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency assistance. After an incident has occurred, a rapidly deployable interagency Emergency Support Team (EST) will provide required capabilities on scene: a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) for foreign incidents, and a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) for domestic incidents. DEST membership will be limited to those agencies required to respond to the specific incident. Both teams will include elements for specific types of incidents such as nuclear, chemical, and biological threats.
The Director, FEMA will ensure that the FRP is adequate for Consequence Management activities in response to terrorist attacks against large U.S. populations, including those where weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are involved. FEMA will also ensure that State response plans and capabilities are adequate and tested. FEMA, supported by all FRP signatories, will assume the Lead Agency role for Consequence Management in Washington, DC, and on scene. If large-scale casualties and infrastructure damage occur, the President may appoint a Personal Representative for Consequence Management as the on-scene Federal authority during recovery. A roster of senior and former government officials willing to perform these functions will be created, and the rostered individuals will be provided training and information necessary to allow them to be called on short notice.

Agencies will bear the cost of their participation in terrorist incidents and counterterrorist operations, unless otherwise directed.

d. NBC Consequence Management. The development of effective capabilities for preventing and managing the consequence of terrorist use of NBC materials or weapons is of the highest priority. Terrorist acquisition of WMD is not acceptable, and there is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of such materials/weapons or removing the capability from terrorist groups.
The following is an unclassified abstract derived from Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas, dated May 22, 1998.

The full text of PDD-62 is a CLASSIFIED document. State and local officials should understand that PDD-62 reaffirms PDD-39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, signed June 21, 1995. As such, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will continue to serve as the Lead Federal Agency for “crisis management” and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will continue to serve as the Lead Federal Agency for “consequence management.”

1. General

It is increasingly likely that terrorist groups, or individuals with criminal intent, may use unconventional methods to disrupt the Nation’s critical infrastructure or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against our citizens.

As these types of threats mature, it is necessary to prepare to deter them, prevent them from occurring, or, if need be, limit the damage to a minimum. Success is dependent upon possessing the capability for an integrated response, and in the case of critical infrastructure protection, having public/private partnerships.

2. Present Achievements and Current Challenges

Present Achievements

- An increased rate of apprehensions and convictions.
- An increase in counterterrorism legislative authorities.
- An increase in the funding for consequence management planning.
- An increase in the importance of terrorism on the diplomatic agenda.
- Growth of assistance to, and cooperation with, other democracies in combating terrorism.
- Improving and expanding a professionally trained interagency cadre.

Current Challenges

- Terrorist groups may choose asymmetrical attacks on our domestic and international vulnerabilities, through the use of WMD and/or cyber warfare.
- Terrorist groups possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities to use WMD.
- Former “cold war” civil defense programs have been downsized or dismantled, and cities are not prepared to deal with a large-scale event.
- Improvements in technology will make it difficult for law enforcement agencies to detect and prevent terrorist acts.
- The Nation’s critical infrastructure relies heavily on the use of computers, which are prone to cyber attacks.

3. Consequences Management

In the event of a terrorism incident, the Federal Government will respond rapidly, working with State and local governments, to restore order and deliver emergency assistance. FEMA,
the Lead Federal Agency for consequence management, is responsible for preparing for and responding to the consequences of a WMD incident with participation of other departments and agencies including the Public Health Service (PHS), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Energy (DOE), as necessary. The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the FBI, is the Lead Federal Agency for crisis management and operational response to a WMD incident.

Domestically, key Federal Departments and agencies, through interagency efforts, will continue training and providing equipment to first responders to prepare them for response to WMD incidents. Emphasis will be placed on preparing those responders in the largest 120 cities.

The Department of Defense, in coordination with other Federal Departments and agencies, will provide training to metropolitan first responders and will maintain trained military units to assist State and local responders. One example is the National Guard concept of initially forming 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams in each FEMA Region. These teams are designed to provide rapid response to a WMD incident and assist State and local responders.

PHS, in the Department of Health and Human Services, is the Lead Federal Agency in planning and preparing for response to WMD-related medical emergencies. PHS will continue supporting State and local governments in developing Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams; maintaining the National Disaster Medical System; and, in conjunction with the Department of Veterans Affairs, stockpiling antidotes and pharmaceuticals in the event of a WMD incident.

4. Equipment

DOJ, in coordination with FEMA, will provide equipment to State and local emergency responders.

5. Critical Infrastructure

It is imperative that the United States be adequately prepared to deal with attacks on critical infrastructure and cyber systems. As such, the President reviewed the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and has signed PDD-63, entitled *Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures* (PDD-63 is For Official Use Only). A white paper, entitled “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive-63,” is available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NHC/htm/NCSDo03.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NHC/htm/NCSDo03.html). This white paper outlines the Administration’s program to deal with threats to our Nation’s critical infrastructure.
Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures

This Presidential Directive builds on the recommendations of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. In October 1997, the Commission issued its report calling for a national effort to assure the security of the United States’ increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services.

PDD-63 is the culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate those recommendations and produce a workable and innovative framework for critical infrastructure protection. The President’s policy:

- Sets a goal of a reliable, interconnected, and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003, and significantly increased security to government systems by the year 2000, by:
  - Immediately establishing a national center to warn of and respond to attacks.
  - Ensuring the capability to protect critical infrastructures from intentional acts by 2003.
- Addresses the cyber and physical infrastructure vulnerabilities of the Federal Government by requiring each department and agency to work to reduce its exposure to new threats.
- Requires the Federal Government to serve as a model to the rest of the country for how infrastructure protection is to be attained.
- Seeks the voluntary participation of private industry to meet common goals for protecting our critical systems through public/private partnerships.
- Protects privacy rights and seeks to utilize market forces. It is meant to strengthen and protect the nation’s economic power, not to stifle it.
- Seeks full participation and input from the Congress.

PDD-63 sets up a new structure to deal with this important challenge:

- A National Coordinator whose scope will include not only critical infrastructure but also foreign terrorism and threats of domestic mass destruction (including biological weapons) because attacks on the U.S. may not come labeled in neat jurisdictional boxes.
- The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the FBI, which will fuse representatives from FBI, DOD, U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Energy, Transportation, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector in an unprecedented attempt at information sharing among agencies in collaboration with the private sector. The NIPC will also provide the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the Federal Government’s response to an incident, mitigating attacks, investigating threats and monitoring reconstitution efforts.
- Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) are encouraged to be set up by the private sector in cooperation with the Federal Government and modeled on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
- A National Infrastructure Assurance Council drawn from private sector leaders and State/local officials to provide guidance to the policy formulation of a National Plan.
• The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office will provide support to the National Coordinator’s work with government agencies and the private sector in developing a national plan. The office will also help coordinate a national education and awareness program, and legislative and public affairs. 

For more detailed information on this Presidential Decision Directive, contact the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (703) 696-9395 for copies of the White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
Subject: Management of Domestic Incidents

Purpose

(1) To enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system.

Definitions

(2) In this directive:

(a) the term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Homeland Security.

(b) the term “Federal departments and agencies” means those executive departments enumerated in 5 U.S.C. 101, together with the Department of Homeland Security; independent establishments as defined by 5 U.S.C. 104(1); government corporations as defined by 5 U.S.C. 103(1); and the United States Postal Service.

(c) the terms “State,” “local,” and the “United States” when it is used in a geographical sense, have the same meanings as used in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296.

Policy

(3) To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the United States Government shall establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. The objective of the United States Government is to ensure that all levels of government across the Nation have the capability to work efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to domestic incident management. In these efforts, with regard to domestic incidents, the United States Government treats crisis management and consequence management as a single, integrated function, rather than as two separate functions.

(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic incident management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Secretary is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government’s resources utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies if and when any one of the following four conditions applies: (1) a Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities; (3) more than one Federal department or
agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the President.

(5) Nothing in this directive alters, or impedes the ability to carry out, the authorities of Federal departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law. All Federal departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Secretary in the Secretary’s domestic incident management role.

(6) The Federal Government recognizes the roles and responsibilities of State and local authorities in domestic incident management. Initial responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on State and local authorities. The Federal Government will assist State and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved. The Secretary will coordinate with State and local governments to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise activities. The Secretary will also provide assistance to State and local governments to develop all-hazards plans and capabilities, including those of greatest importance to the security of the United States, and will ensure that State, local, and Federal plans are compatible.

(7) The Federal Government recognizes the role that the private and nongovernmental sectors play in preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Secretary will coordinate with the private and nongovernmental sectors to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and exercise activities and to promote partnerships to address incident management capabilities.

(8) The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United States, or directed at United States citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States, as well as for related intelligence collection activities within the United States, subject to the National Security Act of 1947 and other applicable law, Executive Order 12333, and Attorney General-approved procedures pursuant to that Executive Order. Generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall also coordinate the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States. Following a terrorist threat or an actual incident that falls within the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, the full capabilities of the United States shall be dedicated, consistent with United States law and with activities of other Federal departments and agencies to protect our national security, to assisting the Attorney General to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. The Attorney General and the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments.

(9) Nothing in this directive impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of Defense, including the chain of command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to the Secretary of Defense, to the
commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures. The Secretary of Defense shall provide military support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law.

The Secretary of Defense shall retain command of military forces providing civil support. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments.

(10) The Secretary of State has the responsibility, consistent with other United States Government activities to protect our national security, to coordinate international activities related to the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from a domestic incident, and for the protection of United States citizens and United States interests overseas. The Secretary of State and the Secretary shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two departments.

(11) The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible for interagency policy coordination on domestic and international incident management, respectively, as directed by the President. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall work together to ensure that the United States domestic and international incident management efforts are seamlessly united.

(12) The Secretary shall ensure that, as appropriate, information related to domestic incidents is gathered and provided to the public, the private sector, State and local authorities, Federal departments and agencies, and, generally through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, to the President. The Secretary shall provide standardized, quantitative reports to the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security on the readiness and preparedness of the Nation—at all levels of government—to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents.

(13) Nothing in this directive shall be construed to grant to any Assistant to the President any authority to issue orders to Federal departments and agencies, their officers, or their employees.

**Tasking**

(14) The heads of all Federal departments and agencies are directed to provide their full and prompt cooperation, resources, and support, as appropriate and consistent with their own responsibilities for protecting our national security, to the Secretary, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State in the exercise of the individual leadership responsibilities and missions assigned in paragraphs (4), (8), (9), and (10), respectively, above.

(15) The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland Security Council, and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS). This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to
work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multi-agency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources.

(16) The Secretary shall develop, submit for review to the Homeland Security Council, and administer a National Response Plan (NRP). The Secretary shall consult with appropriate Assistants to the President (including the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy) and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and other such Federal officials as may be appropriate, in developing and implementing the NRP. This plan shall integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan. The NRP shall be unclassified. If certain operational aspects require classification, they shall be included in classified annexes to the NRP.

(a) The NRP, using the NIMS, shall, with regard to response to domestic incidents, provide the structure and mechanisms for national level policy and operational direction for Federal support to State and local incident managers and for exercising direct Federal authorities and responsibilities, as appropriate.

(b) The NRP will include protocols for operating under different threats or threat levels; incorporation of existing Federal emergency and incident management plans (with appropriate modifications and revisions) as either integrated components of the NRP or as supporting operational plans; and additional operational plans or annexes, as appropriate, including public affairs and intergovernmental communications.

(c) The NRP will include a consistent approach to reporting incidents, providing assessments, and making recommendations to the President, the Secretary, and the Homeland Security Council.

(d) The NRP will include rigorous requirements for continuous improvements from testing, exercising, experience with incidents, and new information and technologies.

(17) The Secretary shall:

(a) By April 1, 2003, (1) develop and publish an initial version of the NRP, in consultation with other Federal departments and agencies; and (2) provide the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security with a plan for full development and implementation of the NRP.

(b) By June 1, 2003, (1) in consultation with Federal departments and agencies and with State and local governments, develop a national system of standards, guidelines, and protocols to implement the NIMS; and (2) establish a mechanism for ensuring ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS, including regular consultation with other Federal departments and agencies and with State and local governments.
(c) By September 1, 2003, in consultation with Federal departments and agencies and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, review existing authorities and regulations and prepare recommendations for the President on revisions necessary to implement fully the NRP.

(18) The heads of Federal departments and agencies shall adopt the NIMS within their departments and agencies and shall provide support and assistance to the Secretary in the development and maintenance of the NIMS. All Federal departments and agencies will use the NIMS in their domestic incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities, as well as those actions taken in support of State or local entities. The heads of Federal departments and agencies shall participate in the NRP, shall assist and support the Secretary in the development and maintenance of the NRP, and shall participate in and use domestic incident reporting systems and protocols established by the Secretary.

(19) The head of each Federal department and agency shall:

(a) By June 1, 2003, make initial revisions to existing plans in accordance with the initial version of the NRP.

(b) By August 1, 2003, submit a plan to adopt and implement the NIMS to the Secretary and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security shall advise the President on whether such plans effectively implement the NIMS.

(20) Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, Federal departments and agencies shall make adoption of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for providing Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities. The Secretary shall develop standards and guidelines for determining whether a State or local entity has adopted the NIMS.

Technical and Conforming Amendments to National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1)

(21) NSPD-1 (“Organization of the National Security Council System”) is amended by replacing the fifth sentence of the third paragraph on the first page with the following: “The Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities.”


(23) HSPD-2 (“Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies”) is amended as follows:

(a) striking “the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)” in the second sentence of the second paragraph in section 1, and inserting “the Secretary of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof;

(b) striking “the INS,” in the third paragraph in section 1, and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof;

(c) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “The Attorney General” in the fourth paragraph in section 1;

(d) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “The Attorney General” in the fifth paragraph in section 1;

(e) striking “the INS and the Customs Service” in the first sentence of the first paragraph of section 2, and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof;

(f) striking “Customs and INS” in the first sentence of the second paragraph of section 2, and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof;

(g) striking “the two agencies” in the second sentence of the second paragraph of section 2, and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof;

(h) striking “the Secretary of the Treasury” wherever it appears in section 2, and inserting “the Secretary of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof;

(i) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “The Secretary of State” wherever the latter appears in section 3;

(j) inserting “, the Department of Homeland Security,” after “the Department of State,” in the second sentence in the third paragraph in section 3;

(k) inserting “the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “the Secretary of State,” in the first sentence of the fifth paragraph of section 3;

(l) striking “INS” in the first sentence of the sixth paragraph of section 3, and inserting “Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof;

(m) striking “the Treasury” wherever it appears in section 4 and inserting “Homeland Security” in lieu thereof;

(n) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security,” after “the Attorney General” in the first sentence in section 5; and

(o) inserting “, Homeland Security” after “State” in the first sentence of section 6.

(24) The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned the responsibility for administering the Homeland Security Advisory System to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Accordingly, HSPD-3 of March 11, 2002 (“Homeland Security Advisory System”) is amended as follows:

(a) replacing the third sentence of the second paragraph entitled “Homeland Security Advisory System” with “Except in exigent circumstances, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall seek the views of the Attorney General, and any other federal agency heads the Secretary deems appropriate, including other members of the Homeland Security Council, on the Threat Condition to be assigned.”

(b) inserting “At the request of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice shall permit and facilitate the use of delivery systems administered or managed by the Department of Justice for the purposes of delivering threat information pursuant to the Homeland Security Advisory System.” as a new paragraph after the fifth paragraph of the section entitled “Homeland Security Advisory System.”

(c) inserting “, the Secretary of Homeland Security” after “The Director of Central Intelligence” in the first sentence of the seventh paragraph of the section entitled “Homeland Security Advisory System”.

(d) striking “Attorney General” wherever it appears (except in the sentences referred to in subsections (a) and (c) above), and inserting “the Secretary of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; and

(e) striking the section entitled “Comment and Review Periods.”

GEORGE W. BUSH